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such an empire, because without a similar system cities survive extraordinary cir-
cumstances only with difficulty.  The usual institutions in republics are slow to 
move . . . and, since time is wasted in coming to an agreement, the remedies for 
republics are very dangerous when they must find one for a problem that cannot 
wait.  Republics must therefore have among their laws a procedure . . . [that] re-
serve[s] to a small number of citizens the authority to deliberate on matters of ur-
gent need without consulting anyone else, if they are in complete agreement.  When 
a republic lacks such a procedure, it must necessarily come to ruin by obeying its 
laws or break them in order to avoid its own ruin.  But in a republic, it is not 
good for anything to happen which requires governing by extraordinary measures. 
Niccolò  Machiavelli
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INTRODUCTION: “CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS” EVERYWHERE?3
The Constitution of the United States was written against the back-
ground of perceived crisis.4  It is therefore no surprise that the lan-
2 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY 95 ( Julia Conaway Bondanella & 
Peter Bondanella trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1531). 
3 Although the present Article focuses on the United States, there is a rich body of 
literature that looks at the concept of “crisis,” constitutional or otherwise, in other coun-
tries.  Notable examples include OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES 
OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006), and JOHN E. FINN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1991).  For ob-
vious reasons, many especially fine books have been generated by the history and after-
math of Weimar Germany. See, e.g., PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE CRISIS OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF WEIMAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997); WILLIAM P. SCHEURMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE 
EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1994).  An unusually 
valuable collection is WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bern-
hard Schlink eds., Belinda Cooper trans., 2000).  Finally, mention should be made of 
Clinton Rossiter’s classic, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948).
4 A classic account, although supplanted by later scholarship, is JOHN FISKE, THE
CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY: 1783–1789 (Boston and New York, Hough-
ton Mifflin & Co. 1888).  It captures well the view of proponents of the new Constitu-
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guage of “crisis” has never been absent from discussions of American 
politics or American constitutionalism.  It would be remarkable in-
deed if a country that has unceremoniously ignored an existing con-
stitution—the Articles of Confederation—in order to propose and rat-
ify a radically different one, engaged in civil war, suffered a series of 
economic depressions, fought two world wars (and several other ma-
jor conflicts), and expanded from the eastern seaboard to the mid-
Pacific and the Caribbean Sea5 could fail to test the limits of constitu-
tional government and generate the kind of struggles over power that 
produce claims of “crisis.”  Harry Jaffa’s justly praised book on the 
pre–Civil War Constitution—which tried unsuccessfully to honor the 
demands of freedom and slavery alike—is aptly titled Crisis of the House 
Divided.6  A classic article by Arthur Bestor is titled simply The American 
Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis.7  And that crisis, of course, was re-
solved by a great war (and subsequent Reconstruction) that generated 
more than its own share of constitutional struggles,8 including the 
disputed presidential election of 1876.9
The American Constitution, then, was born in crisis and tested in 
crisis.  The difficulty, however, is that the language of crisis is ubiqui-
tous, applied to controversies great and small.  There is hardly a dis-
agreement in American law, however slight, that someone will not la-
bel a “constitutional crisis.”  Recently, New York Times columnist Bob 
Herbert described with alarm a proposed California referendum that 
would allocate the state’s electoral votes by share of the popular vote.  
The predictable effect would be to eliminate the Democrats’ advan-
tage in California and hand the Republican candidate a sum of elec-
toral votes roughly equivalent to those of Ohio.  Adoption of this pro-
posal, Herbert solemnly warned, “could become a constitutional 
tion that there was a desperate need to replace the Articles of Confederation with the 
new Constitution. 
5 See, e.g., THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1803–1893 (San-
ford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005). 
6 HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE IS-
SUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES (Univ. of Chicago Press 1982) (1959). 
7 Arthur Bester, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM. HIST. REV.
327 (1964). 
8 See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99-119 (1998) 
(describing struggles over expulsion of southern senators and representatives, ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the impeachment of Andrew Johnson). 
9 The most exhaustive treatment of this election is CHARLES FAIRMAN, 7 THE 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Supp. 1988) (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds.). 
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crisis,”10 by which he presumably meant that costly litigation and par-
ticularly heated arguments would follow.11
Or consider Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2006 year-end message 
on the state of the American judiciary.  It was devoted to an “issue 
[that] has been ignored far too long and has now reached the level of 
a constitutional crisis that threatens to undermine the strength and 
independence of the federal judiciary.”12  What was this momentous 
issue threatening the very future of the Republic?  It was “the failure 
to raise judicial pay.”13  Roberts’s language was greeted with wide-
spread ridicule, but it remains noteworthy that someone so well 
known for his skills of effective advocacy would think the term useful. 
And whether or not one believes that the September 11 terrorist 
attacks “changed everything,” one thing has surely not changed:  once 
again government officials and their supporters are repeatedly telling 
us that we are living in an era of crisis and facing an emergency situa-
tion that requires strong measures and drastic action.  In the mean-
time, their critics respond that we face a constitutional crisis precisely 
because of the extraordinary and arguably unconstitutional measures 
used to meet the presumptive emergency.14
In fact, there is nothing new about the promiscuous use of the 
term “crisis” to describe constitutional conflicts of every size.  An im-
portant 2002 article by Keith Whittington noted that almost three 
thousand articles in the press used “constitutional crisis” in reference 
either to the impeachment of Bill Clinton (1026 articles) or to the 
controversy surrounding the 2000 election (1901 articles).15  One 
wonders what Whittington’s count might have been had he examined 
10 Bob Herbert, In 2008, Bush v. Gore Redux?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at A15. 
11 The Constitution provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 
(emphasis added).  For an illuminating analysis, see Richard L. Hasen, When “Legisla-
ture” May Mean More than “Legislature”:  Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of 
Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 600-01 (2008).  Professor Hasen argues 
that one could read “legislature” to refer to a particular state’s “legislative process,” 
which can include popular initiative and referendum, rather than the particular insti-
tution called “a state legislature.” 
12 JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf. 
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Response, The Deepening Crisis of American Constitu-
tionalism, 40 GA. L. REV. 889 (2006). 
15 Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2093, 2094 nn.2-3 (2002). 
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references to the 1986 Iran-Contra episode16 or, a decade earlier, the 
Watergate scandal.17  A survey of The New York Times from 1933 onward 
discovered that the term was frequently used in the 1930s, but less 
frequently between 1937 and 1950.18  Interestingly enough, The New 
York Times published very little about “constitutional crises” in the 
United States in the first half of the 1960s—the banner years of the 
Civil Rights Movement—though the term started appearing more 
around 1967.  As one might predict, there was a substantial spike in 
1973, coinciding with Watergate.  Other spikes, as Whittington’s work 
suggests, appear in 1998 and 2000 because of the Clinton impeach-
ment and the disputed presidential election. 
People generally use the term “constitutional crisis” to describe 
periods when institutions of government are clearly in conflict.  But 
the mere existence of conflict, even profound conflict, cannot be the 
definition of crisis.  Government institutions are always in conflict.  
Every year the Supreme Court hears cases, and the losers usually pro-
claim that the Court has grievously overstepped its boundaries.  Con-
stitutional conflicts, when they do arise, are often resolved relatively 
quickly.  Or, if they drag on for years, like the debate about school 
prayer or abortion, they rarely threaten the foundations of constitu-
tional government.19
Indeed, the American system of government was based on the 
idea that the different branches, as well as the states and federal gov-
ernment, would continually balance and check each other.  Inevitably, 
this means that they will disagree and oppose each other.  If we were 
to say that every such confrontation was a crisis, we would have to con-
clude that the American Constitution was designed to place the coun-
try in a state of perpetual crisis.  To the contrary, our constitutional 
system was designed to allow for often-heated conflicts, like those 
about abortion or race relations, and to keep them within the 
boundaries of ordinary politics.  Conflict in a constitutional system is 
not a bug—it is a feature. 
16 See generally THEODORE DRAPER, A VERY THIN LINE: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS
(1991).
17 See generally MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE WATERGATE CRISIS (1999). 
18 Eric Lomazoff, More than Just “Alliterative Crunch”?  Examining Newspaper 
Use of the Term “Constitutional Crisis” in Modern American History 25 ( Jan. 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
19 To be sure, they might produce acts of civil disobedience—consider the abor-
tion clinic bombings of the 1980s as an example.  However, these do not constitute 
constitutional crises unless the violence becomes far more widespread. 
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Given that conflict between political actors is the norm and not 
the exception in American constitutional life, the idea of constitu-
tional crisis must be far narrower.  We therefore reject the notion that 
any situation in which institutions or actors are at loggerheads consti-
tutes a crisis.  Rather, we must reserve the term for a more special class 
of situations. 
Moreover, one must be careful to distinguish between constitu-
tional crises and mere political crises.  Many observers believed that 
Richard Nixon created a constitutional crisis when he fired Watergate 
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox in October 1973.  But Cox was, after 
all, a member of the executive branch, notionally headed by the 
President, and Nixon’s argument that he had the authority to dismiss 
Cox was hardly frivolous.  Nixon famously refused to disclose the con-
tents of the Watergate tapes to Cox’s successor, Leon Jaworski, but he 
complied with the Supreme Court’s decision ordering such disclo-
sure,20 and, unlike Andrew Johnson or Bill Clinton, left office before 
the impeachment process ran its full course.  From this perspective, 
Watergate was more a political crisis than a constitutional one.  Never-
theless, it could easily have become a constitutional crisis at several 
points if Nixon had publicly stated (which he never did during his 
presidency) that he sought deliberately to go beyond his powers un-
der the Constitution.  The closest Nixon came was through his attor-
ney’s hint that he would obey only a “definitive” decision of the Su-
preme Court,21 and Nixon’s own assertion, many years later, that 
“when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”22
Similarly, impeachment by itself does not constitute a constitu-
tional crisis, even though commentators may often speak in those 
terms.23  Nixon’s proposed impeachment and Clinton’s actual im-
peachment were surely political crises for the respective presidents, 
20 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also, e.g., President’s Statement 
About Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1974, at 69 (noting that the President was making 
certain tapes available to the House Judiciary Committee). 
21 R.W. Apple Jr., Nixon Contests Subpoenas, Keeps Tapes; Hearing Set Aug. 7 on Historic 
Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1973, at 1; see also Philip Shabecoff, St. Clair Silent on Obey-
ing Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1974, at 1 (quoting Nixon’s attorney as saying, “I don’t 
see how [Nixon] can [decide whether to obey] until he gets the decision, reads the 
opinion and consults with counsel.”). 
22 Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1977, at 16. 
23 See, e.g., JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SU-
PREME COURT 114 (2007) (“[T]he president’s enemies ratcheted up the [Monica 
Lewinsky] controversy into a constitutional crisis.”). 
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and one of them actually had to give up his four-year lease on the 
White House.  But it is difficult to detect a constitutional crisis in Re-
publicans’ use of procedures specifically written into the Constitu-
tion—the Impeachment Clause of Article II24—to require Clinton to 
stand trial.  Lawyers, to be sure, argued vociferously about whether 
Clinton’s (mis)conduct constituted a kind of “high crime and misde-
meanor,” but such arguments, no matter how loud and long, do not a 
constitutional crisis make. 
Perhaps the election of 2000 was different.  One reason that Whit-
tington used the dispute over the 2000 election as an occasion to 
measure the frequency of the use of the term “crisis” was that the term 
was in the air in those days.  The certiorari petition of then-Governor 
George W. Bush to the Supreme Court urged the Court to resolve the 
election controversy because “absent a decision by this Court, the 
election results from Florida could lack finality and legitimacy.  The 
consequence may be the ascension of a President of questionable le-
gitimacy, or a constitutional crisis.”25  Needless to say, this argument 
was successful.26  Some persons doubted the authority of the Justices of 
the Florida Supreme Court to order recounts of disputed ballots in 
the 2000 election; others were outraged by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
claimed authority to overrule the Florida Supreme Court, suspend the 
recounting of votes, and thus ensure the ascension of George W. Bush 
to the presidency.  In each situation, opponents of such actions ac-
cused the actors in question of “usurpation” and of precipitating a 
constitutional crisis.  Yet Al Gore almost immediately treated the Su-
preme Court decision as juridically valid, much to the dismay of many 
of his supporters.27  Bush’s inauguration on January 20, 2001, took 
place without serious incident.  To adopt recent terminology sug-
gested by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, the conflict over the elec-
tion, however freighted, was merely an example of a “constitutional 
showdown” between different actors that was resolved relatively 
24 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
25 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 
531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-0836), 2001 WL 34117432.  Judge Richard Posner offers a 
version of this argument in his vigorous defense of the Court’s intervention.  See RICH-
ARD POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE COURTS 141-45 (2001) (warning of the “partisan wrangling,” “free-for-all,” and le-
gitimacy concerns that would have resulted “had the Supreme Court not intervened”). 
26 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (resolving the controversy by 
halting a recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court). 
27 See Richard L. Berke & Katharine Q. Seelye, An End to a Quest:  Vice President Of-
fers to Aid Bush but Admits Disappointment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A1. 
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quickly.28  Whatever its elements of sturm und drang, it did not rise to 
the level of a constitutional crisis. 
People have evoked the expression “constitutional crisis” so often 
that it is in danger of becoming synonymous with almost any deeply 
felt sense of conflict or urgency, as illustrated by Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s plaintive cry that he deserves a higher salary.  Perhaps it has be-
come no more than a marker of emotional intensity, the equivalent of 
pounding the table and marking one’s degree of upset about some 
state of affairs in the world.  Yet we think that the term can serve as a 
useful analytical tool. 
The secret, we shall argue, is to think about crisis not in terms of 
constitutional disagreement but in terms of constitutional design.  Dis-
agreement and conflict are natural features of politics.  The goal of 
constitutions is to manage them within acceptable boundaries.  When 
constitutional design functions properly—even if people strongly dis-
agree with and threaten each other—there is no crisis.  On the other 
hand, when the system of constitutional design breaks down, either 
because people abandon it or because it is leading them off of the 
proverbial cliff, disagreements and threats take on a special urgency 
that deserves the name of “crisis.”  In this Article, we offer a typology 
of constitutional crises based on this insight.  We think that the differ-
ences between them should matter greatly to students of constitu-
tional law and students of constitutional design. 
We argue that a constitutional crisis refers to a turning point in 
the health and history of a constitutional order, and we identify three 
different types of constitutional crises.  The first two types were identi-
fied by Machiavelli in the quotation that begins this Article.  Type one 
crises arise when political leaders believe that exigencies require pub-
lic violation of the Constitution.  Type two crises are situations where 
fidelity to constitutional forms leads to ruin or disaster.  Type three 
crises involve situations where publicly articulated disagreements 
about the Constitution lead political actors to engage in extraordinary 
forms of protest beyond mere legal disagreements and political pro-
tests:  people take to the streets, armies mobilize, and brute force is 
used or threatened in order to prevail.  If a central purpose of consti-
tutions is to make politics possible, constitutional crises mark mo-
ments when constitutions threaten to fail at this task. 
28 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 991 (2008). 
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This definition of “crisis,” which focuses on the ability of the con-
stitutional system to channel and defuse difficulties and conflicts, is 
the most analytically coherent, and it makes the most sense of the ori-
gins of the word.  Traditionally (and etymologically), the word “crisis” 
refers to a turning point or decisive moment in the health of an indi-
vidual, and by metaphorical extension, the body politic.29  Crises rep-
resent a breakdown in a previous balance or equilibrium, a distur-
bance to important values and to the existing order that will ultimately 
resolve in one direction or another.30  A constitutional crisis, then, is a 
potentially decisive turning point in the direction of the constitutional 
order, a moment at which the order threatens to break down, just as 
the body does in a medical crisis.31  It may lead back to a slightly al-
tered status quo, that is, a crisis averted.  The fever provoking a medi-
cal crisis breaks, and the patient returns to her prior condition little 
the worse for wear.  On the other hand, the conclusion of a crisis may 
indeed be an important transformation in the forms and practices of 
power or, in the most extreme cases, the dissolution of the existing 
constitutional order and the creation of a new order in its place.  The 
ultimate medical crisis, after all, is death, as demonstrated most spec-
tacularly in our lifetime by the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics or the dissolution of Yugoslavia.32
Generally speaking, failures of constitutional government, and 
therefore the constitutional crises that portend them, are bad things.  
But it may not always be so.  There are times when constitutional in-
stability is better than stability.  It all depends on the justice or injus-
tice of the regime—or its sheer ability to function effectively in provid-
ing basic governmental goods—and the possibility that things may get 
better or worse as a result. Still, whether one prefers or fears constitu-
29 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 328 (3d ed. 1993). 
30 For an excellent discussion of different understandings of the term, see Whit-
tington, supra note 15, at 2097-98. 
31 Throughout our discussion we assume that the participants understand that 
they are facing a crucial moment.  One can, of course, engage in retrospective analysis 
and argue that decisions blithely accepted should have been recognized as “crises” but 
that nobody recognized this at the time. 
32 Indeed, as we note, see infra text accompanying note 124, one might surmise 
that federal political systems are more prone to constitutional crises precisely because 
almost by definition such systems have the central task of maintaining a union of what 
may be quite diverse subnational entities.  Moreover, the existence of a strong form of 
federalism may both invite, and institutionally make much easier, that particular crisis 
known as secession.  See Sanford Levinson, Is Secession the Achilles Heel of ‘Strong’ Federal-
ism?, in PATTERNS OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 207 ( Jörg 
Fedtke & Basil S. Markesinis eds., 2006). 
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tional instability, it is worth identifying what makes something a crisis 
in the first place. 
I. CRISES VERSUS EMERGENCIES
We begin with an important but easily overlooked distinction be-
tween crises and emergencies.  Emergencies can precipitate constitu-
tional crises, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient causes.  One 
can have emergencies without constitutional crises.  Devastating forest 
fires in California or flooding of the Mississippi River certainly consti-
tute emergencies, but neither constitutes a threat to the national con-
stitutional order.  Instead, they offer the opportunity for both national 
and state officials to demonstrate the ability of existing governmental 
institutions to respond adequately.33  Whenever political forces in the 
country are more or less unified in meeting an emergency—for ex-
ample in wartime, or in dealing with national disasters—there is 
emergency without a perception of constitutional crisis.  When the 
Federal Reserve Board responds to sudden economic downturns or 
when Congress recently granted the Treasury Department vast powers 
to spend 700 billion dollars to revive failing banks,34 few people now 
regard these actions as generating a constitutional crisis, however se-
rious the economic crisis that the country faces.  That is because, fol-
lowing the struggles over the New Deal, the contours of congressional 
power are largely settled. 
Emergencies are perceptions of urgency caused by facts on the 
ground or by the way that people perceive those facts.  Emergencies 
may be precipitated by acts of God, unwise policies, foreign threats, 
demographic events, new technologies, or a combination of all of the 
above.  Constitutional crises, by contrast, are conflicts about the legitimate 
uses of power by persons or institutions.  When constitutional authority 
is challenged, we may have a constitutional crisis on our hands, not 
because there is an emergency or even quite extraordinary action, but 
33 Of course, if government officials prove inadequate to meet the emergency, 
power struggles and crisis may follow.  One reason offered for the inadequate response 
of the Bush administration during Hurricane Katrina was the administration’s ostensi-
ble respect for federalism and the prerogatives of the Louisiana Governor regarding 
control of the National Guard.  If that were truly so, it would be an example of what we 
will describe as a type two crisis, where fidelity to the Constitution leads to disaster.  It 
is also possible that doing nothing out of respect for federalism can be a way of placing 
responsibility (and therefore blame) on the shoulders of others. 
34 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765. 
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rather because there is a dispute between constitutional actors about 
the nature of the emergency and the legitimate way to respond to it. 
Abraham Lincoln’s resupply of Fort Sumter, his failure to call 
Congress into special session once the South left the Union, his sus-
pension of habeas corpus while Congress was absent, and his emanci-
pation of the Confederacy’s slaves as an emergency measure may or 
may not have produced constitutional crises that fall into our three 
categories.  But if any of them did, it was not merely because the 
United States was in peril, but rather because not everyone agreed 
that Lincoln had the powers he claimed for himself to meet the needs 
of the time.35  Lincoln’s misplaced trust in General George 
McClellan’s military judgment created significant problems for the 
Union, but no one suggested that this raised a constitutional problem 
similar to the unilateral suspension of habeas corpus.36
Nevertheless, it should now be obvious why claims of emergency 
may lead to constitutional crises:  claims of exigent circumstances may 
lead political actors to claim the right to exercise greater powers or—
what is frequently the case—to act unilaterally.  As Chief Justice Mar-
shall suggested in McCulloch, it is precisely the “various crises of human 
affairs” that encourage political officials to “adapt” the Constitution to 
allow potentially controversial actions.37  If no one with any institu-
tional authority to oppose the actor, or no mass movement, objects, 
there is no constitutional crisis, even if there is significant constitu-
tional change, or even revolution.  More commonly, however, political 
actors who oppose the claims of power, the claims of emergency, or 
both may try to block the claimants, route around them, hold them 
accountable, or force them to compromise.38  As with the tango, it 
usually takes at least two (opposed) constitutional interpreters to cre-
ate a constitutional crisis. 
35 James G. Randall’s famous book, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 
(rev. ed. 1951), discusses, for the most part, problems of claimed overreach by an en-
ergetic executive in time of war.  But they were “constitutional problems” only when 
one views them from the standpoint of another constitutional actor who disputed the 
executive’s asserted powers. 
36 Of course, from Lincoln’s perspective, suspending habeas was not overreach but 
simply the performance of his constitutional duties to save the Union, comparable to 
his undoubted powers as Commander-in-Chief to replace McClellan with someone he 
deemed a more effective general. 
37 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
38 Conversely, there can be a constitutional crisis (what we call type two) if people 
do not try to adapt the constitutional system to meet serious problems. 
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Just as there can be emergency without a constitutional crisis, con-
stitutional crises can occur in contexts that no one would identify as 
emergencies.  The most obvious example is when a governor dis-
graced by scandal or duly impeached and convicted refuses to leave 
office.  There may be no emergency that requires that the chief ex-
ecutive leave—other than the need to have the forms of law obeyed—
but the governor’s refusal to vacate may produce a crisis.39  Similarly, 
disputes where two different groups claim to be the legitimate gov-
ernment of the state—think of the 19th century Dorr Rebellion in 
Rhode Island as an example40—may not constitute emergencies, but 
they are likely to constitute crises. 
McCulloch v. Maryland provides yet another example.41  When 
Madison, who had notably opposed the First Bank of the United 
States as unconstitutional,42 signed the 1816 charter for the Second 
Bank, the decision was relatively uncontroversial.  Indeed, even as he 
vetoed an earlier charter in 1815, he “went out of his way,” according 
to historian Richard Ellis, “to disassociate himself from those who op-
posed the bank on constitutional grounds.”43  What was bitterly con-
troversial, however, was whether the individual states retained their 
power to tax whomever they liked, including instrumentalities of the 
39 Consider, for example, the language used by the New York Times in reaction to 
Eliot Spitzer’s momentary delay in leaving the New York governorship in the wake of a 
sex scandal.  See Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, State in Limbo as Questions Swirl 
About Spitzer’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/ 
11/nyregion/11cnd-spitzer.html.  A state of political limbo may be tolerable if it is 
relatively brief and there are no emergencies that require a governor to act; in other 
circumstances, however, it may cause serious problems for the state. 
40 See, e.g., RONALD P. FORMISANO, FOR THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN POPULIST MOVE-
MENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE 1850S, at 160-176 (2008); MARVIN E. GETTLE-
MAN, DORR REBELLION (1973). 
41 Indeed, the very first paragraph of Marshall’s rhetorical tour de force evokes the 
potential presence of crisis:  “[The dispute between Maryland the United States Bank] 
must be decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps, of hos-
tility of a still more serious nature . . . .”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400-01. 
42 See, e.g., James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 
2, 1791), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480 ( Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).  An edited ver-
sion of the speech is available in PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING 28-32 (5th ed. 2006). 
43 RICHARD E. ELLIS, AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM: MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND AND 
THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 40 (2007). Only a 
few “Old Republicans” continued to challenge the legitimacy of the Bank.  And, inter-
estingly enough, the defense of the Bank was based far more on its general utility than 
as a “necessary and proper” response to a state of emergency:  it was widely believed 
that American recovery from the ravages of the War of 1812 would be facilitated by the 
Bank. See id. at 37-38. 
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federal government.44  Marshall famously held that they did not in the 
second part of McCulloch, arguing that the “power to tax involves, nec-
essarily, a power to destroy.”45  These, it turned out, were fighting 
words.  Agents of the state of Ohio, unconvinced by Marshall’s logic, 
broke into the Chilicothee branch of the Bank of the United States 
and seized approximately $100,000 of Bank funds in order to cover 
the taxes allegedly due the State.  Although Ohio ultimately submitted 
to the reaffirmation of McCulloch in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,46
we can fairly say that the state of Ohio had provoked a constitutional 
crisis because it publicly stated that it would not obey the Supreme 
Court and because it resorted to force to demonstrate its disagree-
ment.  (Thus, it would be either a type one or type three crisis.)  At 
the same time, the controversy did not arise out of an emergency 
situation.  Ohio’s action was not justified on the grounds of emer-
gency, but rather by claims that the Court had not sufficiently ac-
knowledged its retained powers as a sovereign state. 
Indeed, assertions of power in the absence of perceived emergen-
cies may be the most likely to generate perceptions of “crisis.”  Where 
a “state of emergency” is widely acknowledged, officials within the po-
litical system—often the executive—have the incentive and will to act 
forcefully and energetically to meet a problem.  Only later will more 
detached analysts declare that the perception of crisis was as much 
caused by panic as by a rational assessment of the threat and that the 
solutions chosen might have been irrelevant or even counterproduc-
tive.  If no one—or, perhaps more accurately, no one within the class 
of “respectable” politicians, jurists, or commentators, or a well-
regarded mass movement or social organization—objects to the exer-
cise of power to meet the emergency, there is no constitutional crisis; 
all the relevant stakeholders who might raise substantial objections are 
going along. 
44 Taxation, of course, was one of the most fundamental attributes of sovereignty.  
To be sure, the Constitution explicitly limited that power with regard to taxes on im-
ports and exports.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, although one might infer from this 
explicit exclusion that sovereign states otherwise presumptively retained their rights of 
taxation. 
45 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 327.  Marshall did not note that the prohibition
of the power to tax can also operate as an implicit destruction of a political entity that 
depends on tax revenues for its survival; nor, as Ellis demonstrates, did he even come 
close to explaining exactly why a congressional charter turned an eighty-percent–
privately owned, profit-seeking bank into an instrument of the national government.  
See ELLIS, supra note 43, at 106. 
46 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
720 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 707
This more or less describes the detention of Japanese Americans 
and resident aliens during World War II.  To be sure, some members 
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) objected,47 as did, ap-
parently, Attorney General Francis Biddle in private counsel to Presi-
dent Roosevelt.48  Eventually, three members of the United States Su-
preme Court dissented from the President’s policy in 1944.49
Nevertheless, when Roosevelt signed the relevant presidential orders 
in early 1942, there were few “respectable” voices objecting to this dis-
play of national power.  The national ACLU, for example, cast its lot 
with the President and chose not to challenge the validity of the de-
tentions.50  Attorney General Biddle did not convey his doubts to the 
public; more to the point, there was no significant opposition in Con-
gress, or, for that matter, from editorialists or pundits.  Roosevelt’s 
policy was supported by such denizens as California Attorney General 
Earl Warren and Walter Lippmann, one of the leading commentators 
of the day.51  The Japanese internment was an extraordinary personal 
crisis for the victims of American policy and a rank injustice, but it did 
not amount to a constitutional crisis for the nation at large at the 
time.  Even when the government seriously violates peoples’ rights—as 
it has done throughout our history in times of normal politics as well 
as in times of emergency—this does not necessarily mean that the sys-
tem of constitutional government has failed.  That is because one 
point of a constitutional system is to keep disputes about peoples’ 
rights within the boundaries of ordinary politics.  Sadly or not, consti-
tutional governments can do a great deal of evil without provoking a 
constitutional crisis.52
47 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 133 (1983) (describing disagreement on the 
ACLU board about the President’s policies). 
48 See id. at 53 (discussing Biddle’s meeting with the President on February 7, 1942). 
49 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225-33 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 233-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 242-48 ( Jackson, J., dissenting). 
50 See IRONS, supra note 47, at 128-34 (detailing the series of events that led to the 
internment of Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor). 
51 See id. at 40, 61. 
52 It is not even clear that the Japanese internment is now regarded in retrospect as 
a constitutional crisis, despite the fact that the United States, through legislation signed 
by President Ronald Reagan, formally apologized and gave symbolic financial repara-
tions to the victims of the injustice.  See Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2, 
102 Stat. 903, 903-04 (describing the internment as motivated by “racial prejudice, war-
time hysteria, and a failure of political leadership”).  One of us (Levinson) was at a con-
ference at the University of Chicago some years ago at which former Attorney General 
Edwin Meese was a participant addressing limits, if any, on the national government in 
addressing national security threats.  Responding to Levinson’s question from the audi-
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II. TYPE ONE CRISES: DECLARING A STATE OF EXCEPTION
So far we have argued that constitutional crises comprehend a 
very small subset of the many different cases in which constitutional 
actors find themselves in conflict, and we have also distinguished cri-
ses from emergencies.  In this section, we begin to offer a typology of 
constitutional crises.  What makes them crises, and not simply con-
flicts or disagreements, is that in each case the basic functions of con-
stitutionalism—to channel conflict into everyday politics and thus 
provide for political stability—have failed.  Just as a patient reaches a 
medical crisis when his or her constitution gives out, so too the polity 
faces a turning point when its political constitution can no longer do 
the work that constitutions are designed to do. 
Type one crises are perhaps the easiest to grasp:  political leaders 
publicly claim the right to suspend features of the Constitution in or-
der to preserve the overall social order and to meet the exigencies of 
the moment.  They justify the assertion of extraconstitutional powers 
because extraordinary events require that they rise to the challenge of 
the times.53  In type one crises, actors point to serious problems and 
have the political will to resolve them, but they believe that they have 
only limited constitutional power to realize their goals within the con-
stitutional scheme.  Hence they self-consciously exceed what they be-
lieve to be their constitutional authority in the name of the state.  As 
with James Madison in Federalist No. 40, they are prepared to seek the 
“approbation” of the people that would, if given, “blot out antecedent 
errors and irregularities.”54  Almost inevitably, such arguments take on 
a plebiscitary, even Caesarist, dimension, as leaders seek support and 
absolution from a public that is presumed, at the end of the day, to 
treat constitutional fidelity as secondary to the achievement of higher 
purposes and larger goals. 
This idea has a long history, going back to ancient Rome, which 
sought to avoid the problem through its conception of “constitutional 
ence about the meaning of President Reagan’s willingness to sign the congressional 
statute that apologized and provided reparations, Meese emphasized that at most it was 
a recognition that an injustice was done to the victims of the detention, not an admis-
sion that Korematsu had been wrongly decided as a constitutional matter. 
53 Whittington calls these crises of “fidelity.”  See Whittington, supra note 15, at 
2109-10 (“Crises of constitutional fidelity arise when important political actors 
threaten to become no longer willing to abide by existing constitutional arrangements 
or systematically contradict constitutional proscriptions.” (footnote omitted)). 
54 THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 264, 266 ( James Madison) ( Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961).
722 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 707
dictatorship.”55  In the Anglo-American tradition, John Locke spoke 
with approval of “prerogative powers,” which he defined as the power 
“to act according to discretion, for the public[] good, without the pre-
scription of the Law, and sometimes even against it.”56  Even more to the 
point, perhaps, is James Madison’s comment in Federalist No. 41 that 
“[i]t is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-
preservation.  It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Consti-
tution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a 
germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions.”57  More recently, the 
German philosopher (and apologist for Hitler’s rise to power) Carl 
Schmitt argued that ordinary constitutional norms could and should 
be suspended in time of emergency, for “[t]here exists no norm that 
is applicable to chaos.”58  And the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agam-
ben has argued that “the state of exception tends increasingly to ap-
pear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary poli-
tics.”59
Nevertheless, few American political leaders have forthrightly con-
fessed that they seek to exercise Lockean prerogative powers or invoke 
a Schmittian state of exception.  No American President has ever pub-
55 See ROSSITER, supra note 3, at 15 (“Nowhere in all history has the belief that a 
constitutional state can alter its pattern of government temporarily in order to preserve 
it permanently been more resolutely asserted and successfully proved than it was in the 
storied Republic of ancient Rome.”). 
56 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 393 (Peter Laslett ed., 1963) 
(1690) (emphasis added).  It is worth comparing Locke’s theory of prerogative to Ma-
chiavelli’s approving discussion of the Roman dictatorship.  See supra text accompany-
ing note 2.  What Machiavelli admired about the dictatorship was precisely what distin-
guished it from Locke’s prerogative power.  The Roman dictatorship was 
institutionalized, requiring a particular process before the dictatorship could begin 
and ending it at a specified time.  Naming a dictator might signal an emergency, but by 
definition, it did not constitute a “constitutional crisis” precisely because the Roman 
Constitution provided for the institution. What concerned the republican theorist Ma-
chiavelli was the rise of an extraconstitutional dictatorship in cases where the constitu-
tion lacked a procedure for appointing a dictator and ending the dictator’s reign. 
57 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 270 ( James Madison) ( Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphasis added). 
58 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE THEORY OF SOV-
EREIGNTY 13 (George Schwab trans., 1985) (1922), quoted in Sanford Levinson, Consti-
tutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 721 (2006). 
59 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 2 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005).  For po-
tential corroboration of Agamben’s descriptive point, see GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra
note 3.  See also Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas:  The Post-
9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency, in THE MIGRATION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 347 (Sujit Choudry ed., 2006); Kim Lane Scheppele, Small
Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835 (2006); Kim Lane Scheppele, North American Emergencies:  
The Uses of Emergency Powers in Canada and the United States, 4 INT. J. CON L. 213 (2006). 
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licly admitted to out-and-out suspension of the Constitution because 
of exigencies of the situation.  Instead, our leaders have either kept 
their activities secret or publicly offered controversial interpretations 
of the Constitution to legitimize their actions.  This was true of Abra-
ham Lincoln; it is certainly true of George W. Bush.  To be sure, these 
claims of constitutional fidelity have been widely disputed.  Former 
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis, for example, bitterly accused 
Lincoln of overreaching in the name of emergency.60  And one could 
literally fill a book with criticisms of the Bush administration’s theory 
of the President’s powers under Article II.61  But bitter criticism, even 
if we think it is justified, does not a type one crisis make. 
Thomas Jefferson may have come closest to asserting prerogative 
power.  In private, at least, he admitted that he was never really com-
fortable with the notion that the United States could more than dou-
ble its size through the Louisiana Purchase without formal constitu-
tional amendment.  Jefferson famously wrote, in an 1810 letter, that 
[a] strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of the high duties 
of a good citizen, but it is not the highest.  The laws of necessity, of self-
preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obliga-
tion.  To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would 
be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are en-
joying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.
62
Jefferson, however, never publicly stated his doubts or claimed that, as 
President, he had the right to make exceptions to the existing legal 
order. 
Nor, for that matter, did Jefferson explain even privately why the 
Louisiana Purchase would meet stringent tests of “necessity.”  The 
Purchase, which obviously went far beyond the initial aim of securing 
New Orleans and control over the Mississippi River, was an out-
standing, almost literally incredible, opportunity to gain massive 
60 2 BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, LL.D. 
306-35 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1879), reprinted in BREST 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 280-81. 
61 For an explication of the Bush administration’s theory, see JOHN YOO, THE POW-
ERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); 
for criticism by a former Bush administration insider, see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TER-
ROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007).  For 
considerably more vehement criticism, see ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAK-
ING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007). 
62 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), reprinted in 4 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 127, 127 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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amounts of territory and secure larger borders, but it was not an act 
that was necessary to meet some imminent threat.  The only “emer-
gency” immediately facing Jefferson in 1803 was the possibility that 
Napoleon would withdraw his remarkable offer—or even convey it to 
another power—unless the United States acted quickly.  If another 
imperial power could potentially have taken Louisiana, the purchase 
might well have been prudent in order to avoid long-term difficulties 
for the fledgling republic.  In any case, Jefferson’s Secretary of the 
Treasury, Albert Gallatin, had none of Jefferson’s qualms about con-
stitutionality; he saw the acquisition of Louisiana as an unproblematic 
use of the Treaty Power.63  Ultimately, Jefferson himself chose to swal-
low his doubts, and he cautioned one of his allies in Congress simply 
to remain silent about constitutional difficulties.64
Similarly, Abraham Lincoln came close at times to making a 
Schmittian argument in private correspondence:  “I felt that measures 
otherwise unconstitutional,” he once wrote, “might become lawful, by 
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, 
through the preservation of the nation.”65  Here Lincoln recognizes 
that constitutions are ultimately instruments to preserve a preexisting 
nation.  To achieve this overarching purpose, political actors may 
sometimes ignore the Constitution when it becomes dysfunctional.  
Even so, Lincoln never publicly proclaimed that he had exercised a 
“right” to ignore constitutional limits in order to achieve the good of 
the country. 
American constitutional history after George Washington’s inau-
guration has produced no unequivocal examples of type one crises. 
That is because type one crises require political leaders to admit pub-
licly (and perhaps even proudly) that they are going outside the law to 
preserve the country.  The lack of such type one crises should not be 
surprising.  After all, there is normally nothing to be gained politi-
cally—and much to be lost—by a leader’s admitting to constitutional 
infidelity.  As with other forms of infidelity, secrecy is likely to appear a 
far better strategy.  More to the point, our tradition of constitutional 
63 DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 245-
46 (1994). 
64 See id. at 250 (quoting Jefferson as saying that “the less that is said about the 
Constitutional difficulties, the better”). 
65 Letter from Pres. Abraham Lincoln to Sen. Albert Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), re-
printed in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 585, 585 (1989), 
quoted in Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1257, 1266 (2004). 
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interpretation allows such flexibility in making constitutional argu-
ments that no President ever need admit that he or she is disobeying 
the Constitution.  The modern presidency is well equipped with a Jus-
tice Department and an Office of Legal Counsel, usually containing 
the finest legal talent in the country, busily justifying the President’s 
actions.  Moreover, sympathetic commentators and pundits in the 
mass media are usually only too happy to explain why the President’s 
actions are legal and for the greater good of the nation, often invok-
ing Justice Jackson’s famous trope that the Bill of Rights is not a “sui-
cide pact,”66 implying that the Constitution can (and should) always be 
interpreted to avoid such a dire result. 
Along these lines, the George W. Bush administration has repeat-
edly suggested that it would be suicidal to require the President to 
obey either domestic or international laws that conflict with its own 
best judgments about how to conduct the “global war on terror.”  Far 
from claiming a mandate to ignore the Constitution, though, admini-
stration officials have contended that Article II, properly understood, 
vests the President with the whole of “[t]he executive Power”67 (as op-
posed to the limited and enumerated power “herein granted” to Con-
gress in Article I68).  This grant of power to the President, they con-
tend, contains inherent authority that neither Congress nor 
international law can override.  Why should a President ever admit 
that he is outside the law when so many people both in and out of the 
government—including federal judges and law professors—are so ea-
ger to assert that he is well within it?69
If presidents feel that they must go outside constitutional bounda-
ries, they are far more likely to try to keep their actions secret and 
their options open.  Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency offers several ex-
amples.  During the Great Depression, Roosevelt temporarily removed 
U.S. currency from the gold standard.  In the Gold Clause Cases, each 
decided five to four, the Supreme Court avoided invalidating the 
President’s actions, although it suggested that he lacked the powers 
66 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) ( Jackson, J., dissenting); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY (2006). 
67 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
68 Id. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. 
69 For federal judges, see, most notably, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579-99 
(2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting), arguing that the President acted within his constitu-
tional power.  For law professors, see YOO, supra note 61. 
726 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 707
he claimed.70  There is good evidence that Roosevelt was prepared to 
defy a Supreme Court order overturning his suspension.71  Several 
years later, when the Supreme Court heard the case of the Nazi sabo-
teurs, Ex Parte Quirin,72 Roosevelt made clear in secret that he would 
execute the spies regardless of what the Court decided to do.73  In 
both cases, Roosevelt kept his options open but did not provoke a 
public constitutional crisis, which certainly would have occurred if he 
had announced that he would defy the Court in either case. 
Roosevelt’s apparent disregard of statutes requiring American 
neutrality in the years up to the Second World War offers yet another 
example.74  While the Lend-Lease program with Great Britain was pub-
licly debated, Roosevelt also engaged in secret activity that, if it had 
become known, might well have triggered a constitutional crisis.  Ac-
cording to Robert Sherwood, who served as a liaison between Roose-
velt and British Security Coordination, 
FDR never for a moment overlooked the fact that his actions might lead 
to his immediate or eventual impeachment. . . . [H]e had this independ-
ent responsibility which devolves upon the Chief Executive to defend the 
nation in the way he thinks best.  Each time he regularized one of his ac-
tions though, events forced him into yet another action that might result 
in impeachment.
75
70 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 
(1935); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
71 See KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 37-
38 (2007) (noting that Roosevelt had a speech drafted quoting Lincoln’s statement 
that the Supreme Court could not unilaterally decide questions of vital importance). 
72 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
73 See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939–1975, at 139 (1980) (report-
ing that Attorney General Francis Biddle had told members of the Court that Roose-
velt “would simply not tolerate any delay” and the Army would “go ahead and execute 
the men whatever the Court did”). 
74 For extensive discussions of Roosevelt’s policies meant to aid Britain, see, for 
example, ROBERT JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROO-
SEVELT 82-110 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., War and the Con-
stitution:  Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in LINCOLN, THE WAR PRESIDENT 
145, 162-65 (Gabor S. Boritt ed., 1992).  Schlesinger concedes the “strained” nature of 
Jackson’s opinion as Attorney General approving the legality of Lend-Lease, which was 
based on statutory construction and not on any notion of inherent powers as Com-
mander-in-Chief.  He defends Roosevelt’s action far more as “a defensible application 
of the Locke-Jefferson-Lincoln doctrine of emergency prerogative” than as a scrupu-
lous adherence to constitutional niceties.  Id. at 164; see also David J. Barron & Martin 
S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 941, 1043-1051 (2008) (discussing the Roosevelt administration’s legal 
justifications). 
75 WILLIAM STEVENSON, A MAN CALLED INTREPID 254 (1976). 
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These remarkable decisions did not become public for many years af-
ter Roosevelt’s death.  We do not regard them as type one constitu-
tional crises because the President did not publicly disobey the law 
and nobody knew enough to challenge him. 
Even so, we do not deny the logical possibility of “secret” constitu-
tional crises.  One example would be where Congress believes that the 
President has secretly violated the law and takes steps to stop him, also 
in secret.  If a power struggle of this nature emerges, however, it is 
very likely that at some point it will come out in the open.  Of course 
we can also imagine a situation where a coup occurs completely in se-
cret, a new leader is publicly proclaimed, and nobody resists.  In that 
case there has been a constitutional and political revolution, but not, 
strictly speaking, a constitutional crisis.76
Indeed, the last type one crisis in American history may have oc-
curred in Philadelphia in 1787, when proponents of the new Constitu-
tion deliberately ignored their limited mandate from Congress and, 
more importantly, the requirements of Article XIII of the Articles of 
Confederation that any amendments be approved by the state legisla-
ture of every one of the thirteen states within the Confederation.77
The latter provision effectively gave Rhode Island a veto over any pro-
posed constitutional changes.  Although the delegates’ debates oc-
curred in secret, once they emerged from their deliberations, they 
publicly proclaimed their proposed Constitution to the country and 
avidly sought its adoption in violation of Article XIII. 
Responding to claims of the limited powers of the Philadelphia 
conventioneers, Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph told his fellow 
delegates on June 16, 1787, “There are great seasons when persons 
with limited powers are justified in exceeding them, and a person 
would be contemptible not to risk it.”78  Perhaps our favorite quota-
tion remains that of Alexander Hamilton, addressing the Convention 
two days later:  “To rely on [and] propose any plan not adequate to 
these exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would 
be to sacrifice the means to the end.”79  We have always loved the use 
of the word “merely” in this sentence, as if legal limits could be treated 
like a troublesome gnat to be crushed.  Hamilton, a brilliant lawyer, 
76 We are indebted to University of Minnesota professor Heidi Kitrosser for asking 
about the possibility of “secret” constitutional crises. 
77 See U.S. ART. CONFED. art. XIII (1778). 
78 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 342 (Max Farrand ed., 
1937).
79 Id. at 283 (emphasis added). 
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might have been suggesting legal ambiguity through his use of the 
term “not clearly,” but it would be difficult indeed to show any inde-
terminacy in Article XIII and its statement that “any alteration” of the 
Articles shall “be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be 
afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”80  What part of 
“every State” could Hamilton have found unclear?  At most one could 
argue that the delegates deemed the Articles dissolved (even though 
they were declared “perpetual”81), and that the ratification of the new 
Constitution was nothing less than a new regime, a political revolu-
tion, and an important political event that, nonetheless, raised no se-
rious problems of constitutional fidelity because there was no Consti-
tution (or other body of law) to be faithful to.  This is the view taken 
by our friend and colleague Akhil Reed Amar.82
By contrast, another friend and colleague, Bruce Ackerman, ar-
gues that the creation of the Constitution did violate fidelity to the Ar-
ticles.83  Similarly, Ackerman argues that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not comply with the requirements of Article V of the Constitu-
tion.84  Republicans secured two-thirds support in the House and Sen-
ate only by excluding the elected officials representing the Southern 
States.  These were states that President Andrew Johnson had recently 
recognized as restored and returned to the Union; indeed, these same 
states had been counted as sufficiently legitimate to support the ratifi-
cation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  However, when it became ob-
vious that unreconstructed southern state governments would reject 
the Fourteenth Amendment and thus make it impossible to achieve 
the constitutionally mandated three-quarters of the states, the Repub-
lican majority in the “rump” Congress imposed military reconstruc-
tion, created new state governments predicated on black suffrage, and 
instructed them to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment if they ever 
wished to see their elected representatives and senators take their 
seats in Congress. 
Ackerman argues that most if not all of this violated the Constitu-
tion.85  Nevertheless, unlike the Philadelphia delegates, the Recon-
80 U.S. ART. CONFED. art. XIII (1778). 
81 Id.
82 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 25-38 (2005) 
(arguing that if the Articles of Confederation had ceased to apply, then there was no 
“illegality” occurring in Philadelphia or in the subsequent ratification process). 
83 See  2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at ch. 2. 
84 Id. at 110-13. 
85 See id.
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struction “rump” Congress of 1866 claimed that it was acting in perfect 
conformity with the Constitution (and Professor Amar, for one, agrees 
with this assessment).  It justified kicking out southern senators and 
representatives under its authority to judge the qualifications of its 
members, and it justified military Reconstruction under its Article IV 
obligation to guarantee the states a republican form of government.  
And, when Congress attempted to rid the country of President Andrew 
Johnson, it did so within the framework of the Impeachment Clause 
rather than claiming Cromwellian powers to dispatch the reigning 
quasi-monarch.86  If there was a crisis, it did not involve a party proudly 
going outside the Constitution but a dispute between actors about 
whether they had complied with constitutional obligations.  (That is, it 
would not be a type one crisis, but a type three crisis.) 
III. TYPE TWO CRISES: EXCESSIVE FIDELITY TO A FAILING CONSTITUTION
Type one crises are usually easy to discern precisely because rele-
vant decision makers will admit, perhaps defiantly, that they are going 
beyond constitutional limits for the public good.  Type two crises pre-
sent the opposite situation.  They occur when all relevant actors com-
ply with their widely accepted constitutional duties and roles, but fol-
lowing the accepted understandings of the Constitution fails to resolve 
an existing political crisis or leads to disaster.87  (Thus, one might say 
that type two crises arise in situations where the Constitution really is a 
suicide pact.)  Type two crises involve failures of constitutional struc-
tures that the relevant actors do not dispute or attempt to escape.  If 
type one crises feature actors who publicly depart from fidelity to the 
Constitution, type two crises arise from excess fidelity, where political 
actors adhere to what they perceive to be their constitutional duties 
even though the heavens fall.88
86 This characterization may be unfair to Cromwell and his supporters, because 
they argued vigorously that King Charles was in violation of the tacit “constitution” that 
limited the power of the monarch particularly with regard to the exaction of taxes.  See
MARK KISHLANSKY, A MONARCHY TRANSFORMED 192 (1996) (“[W]hile his political al-
legiances oscillated unpredictably, his basic beliefs held steady.  His defense of the se-
curity of property was absolute and brought him into conflict with the King . . . .”); see
also HENRY PARKER, THE CASE OF SHIPMONY BRIEFLY DISCOURSED (n.p. 1640) (arguing 
against ostensibly royal taxation). 
87 Whittington calls these “operational crises.”  Whittington, supra note 15, at 2101. 
88 Not all difficulties with the Constitution rise to the level of serious threats to the 
constitutional system.  Many features of our constitutional system are inconvenient or 
unfair, but they do not threaten the continuation of the Constitution or the nation.  
The Twenty-Second Amendment prevents competent Presidents from serving a third 
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Such crises are no doubt rare, but one important example might 
be the actions (or, more properly, nonactions) of Lincoln’s immedi-
ate predecessor, James Buchanan—widely thought to be one of our 
worst presidents.  In the period from Lincoln’s election in November 
1860 until his inauguration on March 4, 1861, Buchanan, who re-
tained all the legal prerogatives of his office, sat idly by while state af-
ter state in the South seceded from the Union.89  He believed, and 
strongly argued in a December 6, 1860, message to Congress, that the 
seceding states had violated the Constitution.  He also believed, how-
ever, that the Constitution did not give the national government the 
power to prevent secession by using force.  As Buchanan eloquently 
put it, 
term, even in time of war or national danger.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.  The 
Natural Born Citizen Clause of Article II keeps talented persons from serving as Presi-
dent. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.  The equal representation of states in the Senate biases 
national policy away from the interests of  majorities.  See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  The Elec-
toral College skews how presidential candidates run campaigns and how they govern in 
pursuit of reelection.  See id. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  The rules 
for picking Presidents and Vice Presidents if the electoral college does not produce a 
winner are convoluted and could someday lead to political stalemate and what we call 
a type three crisis.  See id. amend. XII.  Finally, the amendment provisions of Article V 
are very difficult to meet and could prove useless in an emergency.  These features of 
the Constitution may be unwise, even “stupidities.”  See generally CONSTITUTIONAL STU-
PIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson 
eds., 1998).  But they do not by themselves create a type two crisis.  Nevertheless, as we 
discuss below, various features of the Constitution can prove dysfunctional in context 
and create crisis if circumstances change sufficiently.  If these circumstances were pre-
dictable in advance, we could say that the crisis was “latent.” 
 As we shall discuss more fully, the seeds of a constitutional crisis can exist for many 
years in the background of political life, becoming salient only when events demon-
strate that the existing constellation of political forces is inadequate to meet the needs 
of everyday governance.  When this happens, crisis seems to emerge suddenly.  But, in 
fact, the causes of the current difficulty may have been set in motion long ago.  These 
latent or hidden crises are the greatest test of a constitutional system, and they are of 
the utmost importance to students of constitutional design. 
89 The type two crisis was prolonged and exacerbated by the long but constitu-
tionally required hiatus between the November election and the March inauguration.  
It is worth noting that although Lincoln disagreed with Buchanan about whether the 
Constitution allowed the President to resist secession, he did not suggest that he could 
take office earlier than March 4 even though he no doubt believed that Buchanan’s 
scruples were literally destroying the Union.  Nor, seventy years later, would Franklin 
Roosevelt argue that he should take office early because of the exigencies of the Great 
Depression.  As a matter of fact, the Twentieth Amendment made Roosevelt’s the last 
inauguration to take place on March 4—it now occurs on January 20.  See U.S. CONST.
amend. XX.  Even so, the present hiatus of “only” ten weeks between Election Day in 
November and the inauguration in January may still be too long in some circum-
stances.
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[t]he fact is that our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be 
cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war.  If it can not live 
in the affections of the people, it must one day perish.  Congress pos-
sesses many means of preserving it by conciliation, but the sword was not 
placed in their hand to preserve it by force.
90
Buchanan’s views of his own constitutional power reduced him to 
the role of an onlooker, unable to do anything more than present rea-
soned arguments why the southern states were mistaken in believing 
that Lincoln’s election truly threatened them.  This situation was the 
opposite of a collision of forces.  Rather, it was a President who sin-
cerely believed that the Constitution did not allow him to deal with 
the most urgent problem facing the nation.  More to the point, both 
Buchanan and his southern adversaries agreed that the Constitution 
afforded him no remedy.  From their joint perspective, if Buchanan 
acted to stop the South he would foment a type one crisis, for he 
would have gone well beyond his constitutional powers. 
If Buchanan had different views about secession and acted to halt 
the exit of southern states, he would have generated a type three cri-
sis, which is exactly what happened after Abraham Lincoln took the 
reins of power.  That is how type two crises become type three crises:  
necessity leads political actors to change their minds about what the 
Constitution permits, or it produces new leaders with different views.  
Of course, even if one agreed with Buchanan’s reading of his own lim-
ited powers under Article II, one might still maintain that if there was 
ever an occasion for a Schmittian (or Lockean or Hamiltonian) un-
derstanding of presidential prerogative, it was the secession crisis of 
1860–1861.  That is how type two crises become type one crises:  if po-
litical actors do not believe that the Constitution provides the neces-
sary resources to meet a threat to the nation, they may feel an irre-
sistible urge to transcend constitutional limits. 
One might dispute that the Buchanan example really is  a type two 
crisis precisely because most of us are children of Abraham Lincoln, 
who rejected his predecessor’s crabbed reading of constitutional pos-
sibility.  If there was a crisis, the thinking goes, it was caused only by 
Buchanan’s unnecessarily narrow reading of the Constitution and not 
by the Constitution itself.  But what is central to identifying a type two 
crisis is what relevant political actors believe, not what someone look-
ing from the outside maintains is a better interpretation.  It is worth 
90 BREST ET AL., supra note 42, at 264 (quoting Buchanan’s 1860 State of the  
Union address). 
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noting that Lincoln himself recognized important limits on constitu-
tional interpretation.  He did not, for example, try to assume the 
presidency early in order to displace the feckless Buchanan and head 
off secession.  Early in the war, he explicitly rejected the authority of 
Union generals—or even the Commander-in-Chief—to emancipate 
slaves in conquered territories.  Referring to just such a proclamation 
by General John C. Fremont, Lincoln denounced it as “simply ‘dicta-
torship.’ . . . Can it be pretended that it is any longer the government 
of the U.S.—any government of Constitution and laws,—wherein a 
General, or a President, may make permanent rules of property by 
proclamation?”91  This may help to explain why the Emancipation 
Proclamation that he finally issued on January 1, 1863, did not apply 
to territory that had been successfully conquered and pacified by the 
Union troops. 
Some type two crises are hidden or latent crises.  Flaws in constitu-
tional design may create problems that only emerge after years of po-
litical interaction or that suddenly appear due to changed circum-
stances.  A prime example involved the effects of the three-fifths rule 
for counting “other persons”—that is, slaves—which gave the South 
extra representation in the House of Representatives and extra votes 
in the Electoral College.92  This “slavery bonus” in the Electoral Col-
lege explains why Thomas Jefferson, and not John Adams, was elected 
President in 1800, an outcome with profound consequences for the 
development of American politics.93  The three-fifths rule helped the 
South dominate the federal government—including the Supreme 
Court—throughout the antebellum period and helped to turn the 
United States into what Don Fehrenbacher has termed a “slavehold-
ing republic.”94  Moreover, as Mark Graber has argued, the fact that 
the Constitution requires every member of Congress to be elected lo-
cally means that political issues that have strongly regional dimensions 
may become especially hard to resolve; election-seeking politicians 
have every incentive to focus on the presumptive interests of their 
91 Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S., to Orville H. Browning, 
U.S. Senator (Sept. 22, 1861), reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 
1859–1865, supra note 65, at 268, 268-69. 
92 See U.S. CONST. art.  I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
93 See GARRY WILLS, “NEGRO PRESIDENT”: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 49 
(2003) (“It became clear in retrospect that the election of 1800 was a great tipping 
point in American history, signaling the demise of Federalist domination of the gov-
ernment and the advent of Republican rule.”). 
94 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC (Ward M. McAfee ed., 
2001).
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constituents and forego any particular concern about a wider national 
interest.95  Thus, Graber argues, flaws in the design of the antebellum 
Constitution helped account for the ever-growing regional intransi-
gence that led to the secession crisis of 1860 and the two sides’ inabil-
ity to reach a compromise.96  One might applaud that result if the al-
ternative were maintaining slavery.97  This, however, requires us to 
address another possible cause of a type two crisis:  the fact that the 
1787 Constitution, correctly understood by almost all “respectable” in-
terpreters, required significant collaboration with chattel slavery.  It 
required, in Lincoln’s words, a house divided against itself, which, 
sooner or later, could not stand.98  Lincoln himself recognized the ne-
cessity of this collaboration not only in his view that he must preserve 
slavery where it already existed,99 but also in the duty of even antislav-
ery members of Congress to vote for a fugitive-slave law that would 
help slaveowners recover their runaway “property.”100
As the above examples suggest, type two crises are brought about 
by features of constitutional structure whose defects are magnified by 
changing circumstances.  What might have been merely an anodyne 
95 See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
35-36 (2006) (describing this phenomenon in congressional contests over slavery in 
the 1850s). 
96 See id. at 36 (“The very structure of the national legislature during the 1850s . . . 
practically guaranteed that Congress would be the worst imaginable site for securing a 
broad-based agreement on slavery policies.”). 
97 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred 
Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 80-81 (2007) (noting that historical consequences of 
the Dred Scott decision cut in more than one direction). 
98 Abraham Lincoln, “House Divided” Speech at Springfield, Ill. ( June 16, 1858), 
in  ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832–1858, at 426, 426 (1989). 
99 See BREST ET AL., supra note 42, at 268 (noting that Lincoln never challenged 
the legal legitimacy of slavery in already existing states). 
100 Consider Lincoln’s statements in his debates with Stephen Douglas: 
Now on what ground would a member of Congress who is opposed to slavery 
in the abstract vote for a fugitive law, as I would deem it my duty to do?  Be-
cause there is a Constitutional right which needs legislation to enforce it.  And 
although it is distasteful to me, I have sworn to support the Constitution, and 
having so sworn I cannot conceive that I do support it if I withheld from that 
right any necessary legislation to make it practical. 
Abraham Lincoln, Reply to Sen. Stephen A. Douglas in Their Third Debate (Sept. 15, 
1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832–1858, supra note 98, at 
620; see also Abraham Lincoln, Reply to Sen. Stephen A. Douglas in Their Seventh De-
bate (Oct. 15, 1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, supra
note 65, at 813 (“Why then do I yield support to a fugitive slave law?  Because I do not 
understand that the Constitution, which guarantees that right, can be supported with-
out it.”). 
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feature of the constitutional system at one point may become a serious 
problem in a new context.  For example, the U.S. Constitution, in 
contrast to many parliamentary systems, establishes a system of fixed 
elections and inaugurations.  Consider, however, the Canadian Con-
stitution Act of 1982, which provides: 
In time of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, a House of 
Commons may be continued by Parliament and a legislative assembly may 
be continued by the legislature beyond five years if such continuation is 
not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the members of the 
House of Commons or the legislative assembly, as the case may be.
101
Such a provision may work to prevent type two crises by giving officials 
a significant option for responding to particularly dire circumstances. 
Probably Lincoln’s most important acknowledgment of constitu-
tional limits was his recognition that he would have to return to the 
American people—or at least those who had remained within the Un-
ion—for renewed authority in November 1864.  Lincoln apparently 
never contemplated what to some might have been the altogether 
sensible postponement of a presidential election that would occur in 
the midst of civil war.  One might well regard Lincoln’s willingness to 
remain accountable to the electorate as the greatest possible proof of 
his commitment to democracy.  This was no small matter.  On August 
23, 1864, he wrote a memorandum that began with his observation 
that “it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not 
be re-elected,” reflecting Lincoln’s belief that General McClellan, the 
Democratic candidate, might well be elected.102  “Then it will be my 
duty,” wrote Lincoln, “to so co-operate with the President elect, as to 
save the Union between the election and the inauguration [which 
would not occur until March 4, 1865]; as he will have secured his elec-
tion on such grounds that he can not possibly save it afterwards.”103
Given the depth of Lincoln’s commitment to preserving the Union as 
the “last best hope” of mankind, testing the very possibility that the 
experiment in republican self-government might endure,104 it is noth-
ing less than stunning that he would almost certainly have felt bound 
to accept the defeat of his project “merely” (to quote Hamilton105) be-
101 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, §4(2), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix II 1985). 
102 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 529 (1995). 
103 Id.
104 See MICHAEL LIND, WHAT LINCOLN BELIEVED ch. 5 (2004) (discussing Lincoln’s 
determination to stop what he saw as the illegal secession of states from the Union). 
105 See supra text accompanying note 79. 
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cause the Constitution gave him only a four-year term of office that 
would have to be renewed in order for him to serve longer.  Had Lin-
coln in fact lost and the Union dissolved—or been restored with slav-
ery intact106—one might well regard this as a type two crisis.  Today 
many people would condemn him for his refusal to bite the bullet and 
postpone the election.  (Of course, had that occurred, we might well 
have ended up as “children of McClellan,” highly critical of Lincoln’s 
constitutional adventurism, given the propensity of history, especially 
as taught to the young, to represent the perspective of winners.) 
Lincoln, of course, was reelected, but he was killed by John Wilkes 
Booth within six weeks of his second inauguration.  Booth might have 
precipitated a quite different type two crisis had he merely incapaci-
tated but not killed Lincoln.  At that time there was no Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment—itself a response to the Kennedy assassination and the 
realization that an incapacitated President would create serious prob-
lems of succession.107  Both Andrew Johnson and Lyndon Johnson 
could without controversy take the oath of office and assume the full 
legal powers as President of the United States because their predeces-
sors had died.  Had Lincoln lingered for months in a semicomatose 
condition, that might have generated a type two constitutional crisis, 
since there was no one official, whether Vice President Andrew John-
son or Secretary of State William Seward, who could have exercised 
legitimate leadership in the freighted days after the end of the formal 
military struggle.  A similar problem arose when President Woodrow 
Wilson suffered a stroke in October 1919, while (unsuccessfully) at-
tempting to defend the Versailles Treaty, and lingered in office even 
though clearly debilitated.108
As a final example of a type two crisis, consider the possibility of 
an incompetent but mentally sane President serving in his second 
term—and therefore free from any restraints imposed by the possibil-
ity of electoral accountability—who has done nothing that would 
plausibly count as a high crime or misdemeanor.  Even though he is 
106 See BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, ACT OF JUSTICE: LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROC-
LAMATION AND THE LAW OF WAR 126 (2007) (“McClellan had always disagreed with the 
Emancipation Proclamation, and if he became president that document would be ei-
ther withdrawn or ignored.”). 
107 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4 (providing that the Vice President and a ma-
jority of the Cabinet may remove the President from power upon finding that the 
President is unable to “discharge the powers and duties of his office”). 
108 See DAVID PIETRUSZA, 1920: THE YEAR OF THE SIX PRESIDENTS 47-54 (2007) (de-
scribing Wilson as “pitiably weak,” but still “feisty and combative,” in the months fol-
lowing his stroke). 
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causing the country irreparable harm in loss of life and treasure, there 
is nothing anyone can do to remove him from office.  Instead, there is 
seemingly widespread and deep agreement that the fixed constitu-
tional calendar and the provisions for impeachment mean that the 
country must suffer through his feckless incompetence until the next 
election—at which point they must wait still another ten weeks for the 
inauguration of a new chief executive.109
Type two crises almost invariably involve problems with constitu-
tional structure—problems that actors may not even notice because 
they are viewed as almost literally unquestionable background features 
of the political system that all sides take for granted.  Moreover, to the 
extent that our political culture is one defined by a significant meas-
ure of “constitutional faith”110 and Madisonian “veneration”111 for the 
Constitution, the citizenry will likely not blame the Constitution itself 
for the political system’s inability to respond adequately to great issues 
of the day. 
Instead of focusing on the implications of the structures of gov-
ernance established by the Constitution, it is far easier to blame lack 
of leadership, the absence of sufficient political will, or, as a recent, 
breathlessly titled book, The Genius of America:  How the Constitution 
Saved Our Country—And Why It Can Again puts it, unfortunate “atti-
tudes of the men and women” who populate those structures.112  No 
doubt we could use better leadership and more vigorous political will 
on behalf of the public good.  But the constitutional system often 
stacks the deck against even quite capable politicians.  Even the wisest 
109 If a constitution has a robust “emergency powers” provision that allows for its 
own suspension upon the declaration of “states of emergency,” then one might wonder 
if there would ever be either type one or type two crises; the existing constitution itself 
would recognize that normal processes can sometimes be dysfunctional and provide a 
solution (even if some people might describe the solution—a declaration of constitu-
tional suspension—as the equivalent of jumping from the frying pan into the fire).  
This, of course, was the point of the Roman (temporary) dictatorship.  Many modern 
constitutions, like those of France, Germany, India, and Turkey, have emergency or 
suspension clauses.  See 1958 CONST. art. 16. (Fr.); GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESRE-
PUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Federal Constitution] art. 91 (F.R.G.); INDIA CONST. pt. 
XVIII; TURKEY CONST. art. XV.  Ours, quite notably, does not, save for the possibility of 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
110 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). 
111 See Sanford Levinson, “Veneration” and Constitutional Change:  James Madison Con-
fronts the Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 2443 (1990). 
112 ERIC LANE & MICHAEL ORESKES, THE GENIUS OF AMERICA: HOW THE CONSTI-
TUTION SAVED OUR COUNTRY—AND WHY IT CAN AGAIN 196 (2007). 
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and ablest of leaders may not be able to overcome the remarkable 
number of veto points that our Constitution places in the way of legis-
lative achievement.  Thus, the concept of type two crises is important 
precisely because it forces us to confront the possibility that we may be 
ill served by the Constitution’s scheme of governance.  In a type two 
crisis, if everyone plays by the rules, the Constitution will fail us.  In a 
type two crisis, the Constitution is not the solution; it is the problem. 
This fact reveals the deep connection between type one and type 
two crises:  the perceived failure of the existing constitutional forms 
leads political actors to believe that they are justified in violating them.  
Moreover, if many people perceive that the country or the political 
system is in danger, there will be real incentives to demonstrate that 
the Constitution, correctly understood, does not really require march-
ing off a cliff.  As we have seen, a President claiming a right to act in 
time of crisis will not be likely to embrace a Schmittian or even 
Lockean prerogative; rather, he or she will probably argue that Article 
II, correctly interpreted, grants all of the necessary powers. 
What is particularly interesting about type two crises, however, is 
that they can sneak up on us.  Sometimes the relevant actors believe 
that the Constitution does not provide the means to solve problems 
facing the nation, and nobody has the political will to abandon the 
limits imposed by the Constitution as they understand them.  This de-
scribes the situation during the last years of the Buchanan administra-
tion.113  But more interestingly, sometimes the constitutional rules—as 
all relevant actors understand them—are leading the country toward 
greater and greater difficulties, even ruin, but nobody recognizes the 
problem because they are too invested in maintaining and exercising 
the powers the system gives them.  They accept the background rules, 
in spite of the fact that these rules are exacerbating the situation, until 
matters reach a point of crisis—a conflict that comes from playing by
the rules, not against them.  This was true, for instance, of the sec-
tional crisis created by the antebellum Constitution’s rules for repre-
sentation and its acceptance of a special status for slavery.  Our coun-
try managed to avoid disaster several times before (with various 
compromises—including what William Freehling labeled the “armi-
stice” of 1850114).  Ultimately, however, we were unable to recognize 
the limitations of our constitutional structure and lacked an easy way 
113 See supra text accompanying note 89. 
114 1 WILLIAM FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, 1776–
1854, at 509-10 (1990). 
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to change the basics of the political system to resolve the North-South 
crisis short of war. 
IV. TYPE THREE CRISES: STRUGGLES FOR POWER BEYOND 
THE BOUNDARIES OF ORDINARY POLITICS
If type one crises involve acknowledgment of a state of exception, 
triggered by recognition of constitutional inadequacies that, woodenly 
adhered to, would produce type two crises, then type three crises de-
scribe a different kind of political struggle altogether.  In a type three 
crisis, the relevant actors all proclaim their constitutional fidelity; they 
simply disagree about what the Constitution requires and about who 
holds the appropriate degree of power.  In type three crises, each side 
may claim that their opponents are violating the Constitution or are 
wrongly preventing lawful action under it.  That is, in type three crises, 
each side may accuse the other of fomenting a type one crisis, while 
simultaneously claiming impeccable legal pedigree for its own ac-
tions.115  The crisis ends when one side or the other backs down and 
agrees, however grudgingly, to the practical legality of the new legal 
status quo.  Of course, this is true of many other constitutional con-
flicts that do not rise to the level of crises.  Constitutional revolutions 
brought about through what Mark Tushnet has called “constitutional 
hardball”116 need not be constitutional crises.  When Franklin Roose-
velt appointed eight Justices to the Supreme Court (and elevated an-
115 This marks an important difference between our typology and Whittington’s.  
Whittington distinguishes between “crises of fidelity” and “operational crises,” roughly 
corresponding to what we call type one and type two crises.  See Whittington, supra note 
15, at 2100.  We think, however, that among the most interesting examples of crises are 
type three, where the question of fidelity is seriously in doubt.  Two (or more) sides of 
a constitutional controversy struggle for dominance and over whose vision of the Con-
stitution will prevail.  The winner’s interpretation becomes the accepted conventional 
wisdom about the meaning of the Constitution, leading to what one of us (Balkin) has 
called a “Winner’s Constitution.”  See Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, Win-
ner’s Constitutions, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/06/winners-constitutions.html 
( June 7, 2007). 
 Whittington does not regard these as either crises of fidelity or crises of operation 
because “interpretive disagreement still implies a commitment to interpreting a spe-
cific constitution, and to constitutional fidelity.”  Whittington, supra note 15, at 2111 
n.67.  We think this leaves out an important category of constitutional struggles for 
power, in which each side sees the other as precipitating what Whittington calls a “cri-
sis of fidelity,” but in fact there are plausible arguments on both sides.  It is not acci-
dental that because Whittington does not regard what we call type three crises as crises 
of fidelity, he regards constitutional crises as “extraordinarily rare” in American his-
tory, id. at 2095, whereas we see them as somewhat more frequent. 
116 Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004). 
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other to the chief justiceship), he changed the practical meaning of 
the Constitution, but he did not precipitate a crisis—in part because 
everyone assumed that he had the power to nominate committed New 
Dealers to the Court if the Senate confirmed them.  The earlier fail-
ure of Roosevelt’s controversial court-packing plan also did not gen-
erate a crisis; Roosevelt simply accepted his defeat and did not attempt 
to install extra Justices without congressional approval.117  What distin-
guishes type three crises from ordinary disagreements about the Con-
stitution is the means that the parties are willing to use (or threaten to 
use) to prevail.  The Constitution is designed to keep political dis-
agreements—including disagreements about the Constitution’s 
proper interpretation—within the bounds of normal politics.  In type 
three crises, the Constitution fails at this task, and one or more of the 
parties moves outside the ordinary boundaries of politics in an effort 
to win. 
Thus, type three crises are a small subset of a much larger cate-
gory of everyday disagreement about the meaning of the Constitution 
and the political conflicts and machinations that arise from this dis-
agreement.  Although all type three crises involve constitutional con-
flicts and disagreements about the meaning of the Constitution, not 
all disagreements about the meaning of the Constitution rise to the 
level of a constitutional crisis.  Similarly, although crises usually in-
volve what Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule call “constitutional 
showdowns”—attempts to raise the stakes in political controversies un-
til one side or the other gives up118—not all constitutional showdowns 
rise to the level of constitutional crises. 
Type three constitutional crises involve situations in which politi-
cal actors believe that their opponents are taking dangerous and ille-
gal steps that endanger the constitutional foundations of the republic 
or that threaten to bring about fundamental and unjustified changes.  
Therefore these steps justify—and generally produce—extraordinary 
forms of struggle and opposition that go outside the realm of ordinary 
political jostling and political brinksmanship. 
117 By contrast, Bruce Ackerman believes that America’s three major “constitu-
tional moments” all involved transgression of the existing constitutional order.  See  2 
ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 7 (identifying the Founding, Reconstruction, and the 
Great Depression as “crucial transformative periods” that involved the creation of “new 
constitutional meanings”). 
118 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 997 (“[A] constitutional showdown is 
(1) a disagreement between branches of government over their constitutional powers 
that (2) ends in . . . acquiescence by one branch in the view of the other and that (3) 
creates a constitutional precedent.”). 
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Examples of type three crises include the following (listed in 
chronological order): 
(1) the 1800 election stalemate, which began as a type two crisis 
because of the poor design of the presidential election rules and be-
came a type three crisis when various states threatened to march their 
militias to Washington to settle the matter; it was resolved by Jeffer-
son’s election;119
(2) the battle over the “tariff of abominations” that produced nul-
lification resolutions in South Carolina, resolved by Andrew Jackson’s 
military threats and the passage of a compromise tariff that allowed 
South Carolina to back down;120
(3) the 1860–1861 secession crisis that led to and was resolved by 
the Civil War (itself a constitutional crisis);121
(4) the 1865–1868 struggle over Reconstruction, which involved 
expulsion of southern senators and representatives, military governor-
ship of the South, and impeachment of Andrew Johnson, resolved by 
Johnson’s acquittal and his acquiescence in the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment;122
(5) the 1868–1876 struggle over Reconstruction, which featured 
the successful violent insurgency of the Ku Klux Klan and similar 
devotees of the ostensibly defeated Old Order and the disputed  1876 
presidential election; it was resolved by the appointment of an elec-
tion commission, and more importantly, by the “Compromise of 
1877” that led to the restoration of white rule;123 and 
(6) the Little Rock crisis of 1957, resolved by the dispatch of fed-
eral troops to integrate the Little Rock schools.124
It is worth noting that most of the examples on this list involved 
conflicts between the South (or parts of the South) and the rest of the 
119 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 30-35 (2005) 
(describing the history of the deadlocked election of 1800). 
120 See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE  NULLIFICATION CON-
TROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816–1836, at 260-97 (1965).  See generally RICHARD E.
ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS, AND THE NULLI-
FICATION CRISIS (1987). 
121 See, e.g., KENNETH M. STAMPP, AND THE WAR CAME: THE NORTH AND THE SE-
CESSION CRISIS, 1860–1861 (1950). 
122 See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at chs. 4-8. 
123 See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 
1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1951); see also KEITH IAN POLAKOFF, THE POLI-
TICS OF INERTIA: THE ELECTION OF 1876 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1973).
124 See ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT 
SHOCKED THE NATION (2007). 
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nation.  This fact suggests that federalism, and vertical conflicts be-
tween national power centers and regional or local power centers, 
may be a particularly important source of constitutional crises—
perhaps even more important than horizontal conflicts between the 
branches of the federal government. 
From this list, one might also gather that use of military force or 
credible threats of military force are common signs of a type three cri-
sis.  They are not necessary, but they may indeed be sufficient to dem-
onstrate that we are entering into constitutionally extraordinary times.  
Mass demonstrations, coupled with credible threats to take to the 
streets and commit mass civil disobedience—especially if combined 
with hints of the possible exercise of Second Amendment rights—
might also be signs of a type three constitutional crisis.  During the 
1800 electoral stalemate, for example, several state militias considered 
a march on the Capitol to resolve the dispute.125  Similarly, during the 
1876 disputed election, there was grumbling that the recently con-
cluded Civil War might start up again. 
By contrast, the mere fact that the executive and legislative 
branches vociferously disagree—about issues of executive privilege, 
for example—does not by itself generate a constitutional crisis, as 
most of these disputes are generally resolved through negotiation.  
Nor does a constitutional crisis occur when, for example, pro-life state 
legislatures repeatedly pass laws that challenge aspects of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,126 or when local school boards find 
multiple ways to get around the Supreme Court’s school-prayer deci-
sions.127  These are ordinary forms of political struggle in which differ-
125 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 119, at 3 (“The Republican governors of Penn-
sylvania and Virginia were preparing their state militias to march on Washington if the 
Federalists used a legal trick to steal the presidency.”). 
126 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
127 For an example of a state law challenging Roe, see, for example, Monica Davey, 
South Dakota Bans Abortion, Setting up a Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at A1.  For ex-
amples of local school boards clashing with the Supreme Court’s school-prayer deci-
sions, see, for example, Peter Applebome, Prayer in Public Schools?  It’s Nothing New for 
Many, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1994, at A1; Neela Banerjee, School Board to Pay in Jesus 
Prayer Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at A15.  An early book examining the gap be-
tween law on the books and law in action is KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E.
HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE
(1971).  The most recent Supreme Court case involving school prayer is Santa Fe Inde-
pendent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), which struck down school policy as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.  As the Banerjee article suggests, there is no par-
ticular reason to believe that Santa Fe has brought an end to what courts would deem 
unconstitutional practices with regard to school prayer. 
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ent parts of the constitutional system try to bypass each other or push 
each other in order to force acquiescence or compromise.  We all 
know, even if we don’t sufficiently teach our students, that “law in ac-
tion” can differ significantly from “law on the books,” and the gap be-
tween the two does not, save for the most fanatical legalist, constitute 
a crisis of the legal system.  If disobedience becomes so widespread 
that it threatens civil order, on the other hand, “crisis” seems an en-
tirely appropriate word. 
Sometimes events that might lead to a constitutional crisis defuse 
so quickly that the term “crisis” is not really warranted. The “Saturday 
Night Massacre” of October 20, 1973—in which President Nixon fired 
Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, accompanied by the res-
ignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney 
General William Ruckelshaus—is often called a constitutional crisis.128
There was widespread condemnation of Nixon’s action, but it was un-
clear that Nixon acted illegally by dismissing a member of the execu-
tive branch, even though he had made previous assurances that he 
would respect the Special Prosecutor’s independence.129  The crisis, if 
there was one, was caused by the impression that firing Cox meant 
that Nixon would not abide by ordinary legal processes during the in-
vestigation of the Watergate scandal (i.e., people were concerned that 
the situation was on the verge of becoming a type one crisis).  By No-
vember 1, however, Nixon had caved to ordinary political pressure 
and appointed Leon Jaworski to replace Cox. 
It is not even clear that the Watergate scandal as a whole was a 
constitutional crisis, although it was certainly a political crisis of the 
first order.  Even if Nixon’s counsel, James St. Clair, might have 
hinted that Nixon might not obey a Supreme Court order to release 
the Watergate tapes (which would have created a type one crisis), 
Nixon in fact produced them within an acceptable time.  Even more 
to the point, Nixon resigned from office rather than face impeach-
ment and removal.  At most we might say that Watergate could have 
been a constitutional crisis, but (ironically) because of Nixon’s ac-
tions, it ultimately was not. 
The recent struggles over President Bush’s exercise of executive 
privilege, his detention and interrogation policies, his use of presiden-
128 See STANLEY I. KUTLER, WARS OF WATERGATE 406-11 (1992). 
129 See Carroll Kilpatrick, President Abolishes Prosecutor’s Office; FBI Seals Records,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A1 (noting Attorney General Richardson’s assurances on 
behalf of the administration to respect the independence of the Special Prosecutor). 
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tial signing statements, and his authorization of the NSA domestic sur-
veillance program offer another example.  Bush’s critics, including 
one of the coauthors of this Article, may refer to these policies as cre-
ating a constitutional crisis.130  But one must recognize that they have 
not generated extraordinary political opposition by those who believe 
the Republic is endangered.  Many of Bush’s policies have been liti-
gated in the courts, with the administration losing some battles and 
winning others; these are ordinary features of constitutional conflict 
and their resolution.  Moreover, Congress has acquiesced to many of 
the President’s policies, as evidenced by the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006,131 the Protect America Act of 2007,132 and the recent 2008 
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.133  Agree-
ment between the President and Congress (or capitulation, if one pre-
fers the term), even to unwise and illegal policies, is not the same 
thing as crisis.  Indeed, it is the very opposite. 
If the challenged actions of the Bush administration do involve a 
constitutional crisis, they would most likely be a type two crisis, not a 
type three crisis.  They would be structural problems in the constitu-
tional system that Bush’s presidency has brought to the fore.  The idea 
would be that President Bush has taken maximal advantage of inher-
ent ambiguities and possibilities for the expansion of executive power 
in the constitutional system.  The constitutional system always had la-
tent within it the possibilities for what Clinton Rossiter called “consti-
tutional dictatorship,”134 which would ultimately undermine its repub-
lican and democratic character.  The Bush administration’s assertions 
of power merely demonstrate how the presidency gradually descends 
toward dictatorship in times of extended emergency because of a 
130 See Sanford Levinson, Shards of Citizenship, Shards of Sovereignty:  On the Continued 
Usefulness of an Old Vocabulary, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 601, 602 n.6 (2004) (book review) 
(referring to “the jurisprudential (and perhaps constitutional) crisis” generated by the 
Bush administration’s invocation of executive power). 
131 See Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (authorizing “trial by military commis-
sion for violations of the law of war”). 
132 See Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (codified in scattered sections of 50 
U.S.C.) (amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to provide addi-
tional procedures for foreign intelligence acquisition). 
133 See Foreign Intelligence Service Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.). 
134 See generally ROSSITER, supra note 55 (discussing how dictatorship can arise in 
constitutional democracies during periods of extreme national emergency). 
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combination of changes in military hardware, information technology, 
methods of warfare, party organization, and media technology.135
Nor can we say that the 2000 election was a type three constitu-
tional crisis. (It would be a type two crisis only if one thought that our 
system of selecting presidents has led to disastrous consequences for 
the country.)  What was most remarkable about the disputed 2000 
election was the absence of large numbers of people taking to the 
streets in protest or the mobilization of troops to preserve order and 
ensure presidential succession.  Instead, both sides fought out their 
disagreements in the Florida and federal courts, leading ultimately to 
the Supreme Court’s halting of recounts on December 12.136  At that 
point, Vice President Al Gore accepted the Court’s decision, ending 
any possibility of a genuine type three crisis.137  Gore’s capitulation was 
fully endorsed by Democratic political leaders.  No senator, for exam-
ple, rose to protest patent racial discrimination in voting practices that 
occurred particularly in Florida,138 which doomed to failure protests 
that had been filed by members of the House of Representatives.  As 
with Nixon’s earlier capitulation in Watergate, the 2000 election was 
at most a type three crisis that might have been.  Almost all Americans 
now applaud Nixon’s surrender; some still rue Gore’s.  This simply 
underscores the point that for some people there may be worse things 
than a full-scale constitutional crisis. 
A final example is President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills in 
1952.139  This is a borderline case, because the President did use mili-
135 Perhaps a few enthusiastic supporters of the administration would concede the 
presence of a type one crisis inasmuch as they concede that the President, because of 
overarching emergencies, has exercised his extralegal prerogative power.  One sup-
porter of extralegal power in times of crisis has stated that 
[t]o counter enemies, a republic must have and use force adequate to a 
greater threat than comes from criminals, who may be quite patriotic if not 
public-spirited, and have nothing against the law when applied to others be-
sides themselves.  But enemies, being extra-legal, need to be faced with extra-
legal force. 
Harvey Mansfield, The Law and the President, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 16, 2006, at 12, 12. 
136 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that the recount of votes in 
Florida was unconstitutional). 
137 See Burke & Seelye, supra note 27. 
138 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING 
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 99 (2001) (reporting statistical and anecdotal evi-
dence of disenfranchisement that occurred as a result of improper voting practices). 
139 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952) (hold-
ing that Truman’s seizure of private steel mills was beyond his executive power).  See
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tary force.  But his opponents did not act in a similar fashion or even 
take to the streets.  They went to the courts, as did Truman.  More-
over, Truman stated that he acted not only to safeguard the supply of 
war matériel for American forces fighting in Korea, but also to give 
Congress an opportunity to endorse or reject his decision to seize the 
mills.140  He respected the Court’s decision against him and looked to 
Congress for assistance.  If this was a type three crisis, would that all 
such crises were so mild in their progress and outcome. 
The examples of Watergate, the 2000 election, and the Steel Seizure 
Case suggest that there may be a useful relationship between the ways 
that people use (and overuse) the term “constitutional crisis” and our 
more technical definition.  People may have regarded Watergate, the 
2000 election, and the Steel Seizure Case as crises not because they were 
crises in the sense we describe, but because they feared that they 
would become that sort of crisis.  They feared that Nixon would not 
obey the legal system, that Truman would not back down, and that ei-
ther Bush or Gore would refuse to obey an adverse judgment.  That is, 
they feared that the existing constitutional conflict would spin out of 
control and become a constitutional crisis of type one or type three. 
Similarly, when people attack the Bush administration’s expansion 
of executive power, they worry that Bush is fomenting a type one cri-
sis—that he is deliberately acting outside the Constitution.  Of course, 
from Bush’s perspective—and from the perspective of lawyers in his 
administration—he is doing no such thing.  Nevertheless, we might 
also look at anxieties about the Bush administration’s expansion of 
presidential power in a different way.  People have placed their fears 
on the actions of a single politician and his administration, instead of 
considering a different source of anxiety—our constitutional system’s 
susceptibility to slide toward increasing presidential power no matter 
who is in office, and eventually to a form of plebiscitarian dictatorship 
that could drive the country to ruin.  This would be a type two crisis. 
In short, often when people call a situation a “constitutional cri-
sis,” they may not be accurately describing the situation but reporting 
generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE (1977) (analyzing the 
impact of Youngstown on separation of powers and executive authority). 
140 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
1111 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005) (“The president immediately gave Congress 
formal notice of his action, but Congress took no action.”); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 12 
THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 388 (2006) (Stanley N. Katz ed.) (noting Truman’s belief that “a strike 
induced interruption in the production of steel would imperil production of defense 
matériel”). 
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their fears (reasonable or not) about what may happen.  They call 
something a crisis because they worry that the situation will spin out of 
control.  They may worry that one or more parties has already or soon 
will deliberately exceed their powers under the Constitution (type 
one).  They may worry that order will break down, that the parties will 
take to the streets or threaten or use force (type three).  Finally, and 
perhaps most intriguingly, what people call a crisis may be the result 
of long-standing defects in the constitutional system (type two)—
which they incorrectly ascribe to the bad motives of their political op-
ponents rather than to problems in the constitutional system as a 
whole.
CONCLUSION: GÖDEL’S PROOF?
We have described three models of constitutional crises for ana-
lytical clarity, but we recognize that they are merely ideal types.  
Moreover, as we have argued, one kind of crisis can turn into another 
in practice.  Constitutional crises occur against the background of po-
litical actors’ beliefs about problems facing the nation, their political 
will to meet them, and their beliefs about constitutional power.  If ei-
ther their beliefs or their political wills change, or if they are replaced 
by others with different views and attitudes, the nature of the constitu-
tional crisis can change, or indeed, the crisis may be resolved. 
Replace James Buchanan with Abraham Lincoln as President, and 
the type two crisis of secession becomes a type three crisis, because the 
new President (Lincoln) believes that he has the power to stop seces-
sion and acts on his belief.  As we have noted, however, Lincoln did 
not believe that he could take over the presidency immediately after 
his November 1860 election.  He waited until March 4, 1861, as pre-
scribed by the Constitution, thus extending the type two crisis.  More-
over, the antebellum Constitution also provided that the new Con-
gress elected in November 1860 would not have to meet until 
December of 1861.141  This gap allowed the President to act without a 
legislative check or legislative oversight for many months.  Although 
Lincoln in fact called Congress into special session on July 4, 1861,142
141 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (providing that Congress is only required to meet 
once a year, in December), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (providing that 
Congress shall assemble on the third day of January). 
142 Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress (Apr. 15, 1861), available 
at http://www.whitehousehistory.org/04/subs/activities_03/c02_02.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2009). 
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he could have called it into session even earlier.  Failing to do so al-
lowed him, in effect, to assume the powers of a dictator, which, if 
badly used, could have been disastrous for the country (and would 
have been a type two crisis).  As Clinton Rossiter wrote, Lincoln’s “ar-
bitrary decision” not to convene Congress led to “[t]he simple fact 
that one man was the government of the United States in the most 
critical period in all its 165 years, and that he acted on no precedent 
and under no restraint, makes this the paragon of all democratic, con-
stitutional dictatorships.”143
These examples suggest an important point about how constitu-
tional systems evolve over time.  Type two crises occur because people 
share basic understandings about the rules and have insufficient in-
centives or abilities to abandon them or interpret them in different 
ways.  But necessity is the mother of invention, and some type two 
situations may become ordinary constitutional conflicts (or, in ex-
treme cases, type three crises) because political actors usually have in-
centives to reimagine and reconceptualize their powers to their per-
ceived advantage.  Once this happens, disagreements about the rules 
may emerge where none existed before.144  Thus, the continual emer-
gence of new problems combined with continuous incentives for ac-
tors to reinterpret their own powers to their advantage may produce—
instead of constitutional crises—a series of  constitutional struggles 
that will be resolved when the losers accept the winners’ new concep-
tion of constitutional order. 
By repeatedly turning potential type two crises into opportunities 
for constitutional adaptation, the American Constitution may have 
worked itself out of any number of potential dead ends.  Problems cre-
ated by constitutional structures and constitutional regimes give incen-
tives for actors to engage in creative interpretations.  Usually these 
transformations can be managed within the forms of ordinary politics; 
143 ROSSITER, supra note 55, at 224-25. 
144 This marks another important difference between our typology and Whitting-
ton’s distinction between operational crises and crises of fidelity.  Whittington’s notion 
of operational crisis occurs when “following all of the correct constitutional proce-
dures” leads to disorder or when “the constitutional government is incapable of ren-
dering the political decisions or taking the effective political actions that are widely 
regarded as necessary at a given moment.”  Whittington, supra note 15, at 2101-02.  But 
once a reasonable dispute arises about what are the “correct constitutional proce-
dures,” there is no longer an operational crisis in his terms.  Our point is that what 
makes a dispute reasonable cannot always be assessed outside of the context of deci-
sion.  That means, among other things, that there is always enormous pressure to turn 
type two crises into disagreements about interpretation. 
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the New Deal is one example.  In rare instances, however, as in the 
case of the Civil War, they will generate type three crises.  In either 
case, the constitutional regime will have shifted, changing the rules 
and leading to new problems and conflicts down the road that in turn 
drive constitutional development forward.  If this is an accurate picture 
of how the constitutional system evolves—turning potential dead ends 
into uncomfortable but resolvable conflicts—it suggests how unique 
were the sectional disputes that led to the Civil War.  They were a set of 
problems that could not be resolved through this process of crisis gen-
eration, creative interpretation, and crisis resolution. 
For these reasons, it may sometimes be quite difficult to know 
whether one is genuinely in a type two situation—that is, a genuine 
failure of the constitutional system.  The real fault may lie in lack of 
political will, in misjudgments about the nature of the dangers facing 
the country, or in mistaken assumptions about constitutional powers.  
Type two situations may dissolve into ordinary conflicts about inter-
pretation for any number of reasons. 
First, the set of relevant political actors may change:  new actors 
may appear (or others may become newly relevant) who disagree with 
the previous consensus and assert that they have constitutional powers 
or that others lack them.  Type two crises are caused by the failure of 
the rules of the constitutional system.  But deciding whether the prob-
lem consists of the rules themselves or of a bad interpretation of the 
rules depends on what we think are the boundaries of reasonable con-
struction of the rules.  When the rules are subject to reasonable dis-
pute, the problem may not be the rules themselves but the failure to 
choose an interpretation that works. 
Second, if one waits long enough, many potential type two crises 
may simply resolve themselves.  Incompetent presidents must eventu-
ally leave office.  If the President has not done too much irreparable 
damage, a new President and a new Congress will repair what was 
broken and remedy what was left undone.  It remains a type two crisis 
only if time is of the essence and the incompetent President managed 
affairs so badly that the political situation has become incorrigible.  
This suggests that the temporal framing of a crisis may be quite im-
portant in deciding whether there is a crisis, and if so, what sort of  
crisis it is. 
Nevertheless, if constitutional systems can preserve themselves 
through evolution, they can also reach evolutionary dead ends.  The 
framers themselves disliked democracy (as they understood the term) 
because they believed that it inevitably evolved into oligarchy, dicta-
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torship, and tyranny.145  Over time, they feared, clever and unscrupu-
lous politicians would play on people’s emotions and fears and even-
tually seize power for themselves.  They also understood that the Ro-
man Republic had turned into Caesar’s empire and that Cromwell’s 
protectorate had turned into a military dictatorship.146  They designed 
the 1787 Constitution as a republic with checks and balances that 
would forestall the slide of democracies into tyrannies.  Yet it is possi-
ble that their design choices could stem this tendency only for so long.  
First, they could not foresee new problems of executive administration 
and bureaucracy, new methods of making war, and new methods of 
public persuasion and propaganda using media that had not yet been 
invented.  Second, their incompletely fleshed-out plan in 1787 would 
always be subject to creative reinterpretations and glosses along the 
way.  Writing in the twentieth century, Max Weber offered a dark por-
trait of the likely progress of parliamentary democracies over time:  
inevitably, he suggested, they moved toward a form of Caesarism—a 
plebiscitarian dictatorship in which rulers claim authority through ac-
clamation.147
As noted previously, people have accused the Bush administration 
of overstepping its powers, accusing it (correctly or not) of creating a 
type one crisis.148  But we should consider the possibility that what we 
are really facing is a type two crisis.  It is possible that George W. 
Bush’s presidency is merely the continuation of a long-term trend of 
an increasingly powerful presidency that rules through secrecy and 
surveillance, while the President claims that his election constituted a 
plebiscite authorizing (indeed “mandating”) such extraordinary uses 
145 See David J. Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 510 
(2008) (asserting that the framers of the American Constitution feared “excessive de-
mocracy” and believed that “populist politics” could lead to military dictatorship, as 
was the case with Rome under Caesar). 
146 See id. at 508-14 (noting that the “founding generation had crucial historical 
examples of military coups to ponder,” including Caesar’s Roman empire and the Eng-
lish Civil War). 
147 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOL-
OGY 1381-92 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968) (critiquing the German parlia-
mentary system).  This was the theme of Gerhard Casper’s Inaugural Kronman-Postol 
Lecture at the Yale Law School in December 2006.  See Gerhard Caspar, President Emeri-
tus, Stanford Univ., Inaugural Kronman-Postal Lecture at Yale Law School:  Caesarism in 
Democratic Politics—Reflections on Max Weber (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http:// 
www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/News_&_Events/CaesarismYLS.pdf. (discussing the 
relevance of Max Weber’s theories on the plebiscitarian characteristics of parliamentary 
democracies). 
148 See sources cited supra note 61. 
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of power.149  Given changes in media technology and the technologies 
of warfare, our country may be on a downward slide toward Cae-
sarism, with presidents who claim greater and greater unaccountable 
authority in order to fight a never-ending war against hidden enemies. 
According to a celebrated story, the mathematician Kurt Gödel 
once glimpsed the danger of such a slide.150  Gödel is famous today for 
his proof that there are true statements of mathematics that cannot be 
demonstrated logically using its axioms and that one cannot prove 
that mathematics is consistent.151  Gödel had fled Nazi Germany in the 
1930s and later, under the urgings of his colleagues at the Institute for 
Advanced Study at Princeton, became an American citizen.  Indeed, 
Albert Einstein and Oskar Morgenstern accompanied Gödel to Tren-
ton, New Jersey, for the ceremony where he would swear the oath of 
citizenship.  Gödel, it appears, had prepared very carefully for the 
exam testing his knowledge of the Constitution and affirming his “at-
tachment” to the “principles of the Constitution.”152  Prior to his trip 
to Trenton, Gödel told Morgenstern that he had discovered a logi-
cal/legal proof of how one could transform the United States from a 
149 See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 180 (2006) (noting that the United States held a presidential election after 
the revelations at Abu Ghraib and the leaking of the 2002 memoranda on interroga-
tion practices); John C. Yoo, With ‘All Necessary and Appropriate Force,’ L.A. TIMES, June 
11, 2004, at B13 [hereinafter Yoo, Necessary and Appropriate] (“If the American people 
disagree with [the Administration’s detention and interrogation] policy, they have op-
tions:  Congress can change the law, or the electorate can change the administra-
tion.”); cf. Jim VandeHei & Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Says Election Ratified Iraq Policy:  
No U.S. Troop Withdrawal Date Is Set, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2005, at A1 (quoting Presi-
dent Bush:  “We had an accountability moment, and that’s called the 2004 election. . . . 
The American people listened to different assessments made about what was taking 
place in Iraq, and they looked at the two candidates, and chose me.”).  The entire in-
terview is available online.  See Interview by Michael A. Fletcher & Jim VandeHei with 
President George W. Bush Aboard Air Force One ( Jan. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12570-2005Jan15?. 
150 See JOHN L. CASTI & WERNER DEPAULI, GÖDEL 88-89 (2000) (recounting the 
story of Gödel’s citizenship examination); Jim Holt, The Loophole:  A Logician Challenges 
the Constitution, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 1998, at 92 (discussing Gödel’s theory).  For a 
slightly different but noncontradictory version of the story, see Gödel, Einstein and the 
Immigration Service, INSTITUTE LETTER (Inst. for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.), 
Spring 2006, at 7 (noting the version of the Gödel story told in a memoir by Oskar 
Morgenstern, recorded on September 13, 1971).  We are grateful to Mary Dudziak for 
making us aware of this last source. 
151 See GOD CREATED THE INTEGERS 1089-1118 (Stephen Hawking ed., 2005) [here-
inafter INTEGERS] (explaining Gödel’s two incompleteness theorems). 
152 See LEVINSON, supra note 110, at 122-54 (asserting that the Constitution does 
not have an easily ascertainable or static meaning and that this ambiguity makes it dif-
ficult to determine whether or not one is truly “committed to the Constitution”). 
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democracy into a dictatorship.  According to one source, the flaw lay 
in the Recess Appointment Clause,153 by which presidents can fill va-
cancies without Senate approval.  “This, Gödel reasoned, could lead to 
a dictatorship.”154  Morgenstern recognized that the hypothetical pos-
sibility and its likely remedy involved complex chains of reasoning and 
were clearly not suitable for discussion at the citizenship interview.  
He urged Gödel to keep quiet about his discovery. 
The next morning, Morgenstern drove Einstein and Gödel from 
Princeton to Trenton.  Along the way, Gödel told Einstein his theory 
of constitutional dictatorship.  Hoping to avoid a potential debacle, 
Einstein tried to distract him with stories.  The official in charge in 
Trenton was Judge Philip Forman, who had inducted Einstein in 1940 
and struck up a friendship with him.  He greeted them warmly and in-
vited all three to attend the (normally private) examination of Gödel.  
The Judge began, “Up to now you have held German citizenship.”155
Gödel interrupted him and noted that his citizenship was actually Aus-
trian.  “Anyhow,” Forman continued, “it was under an evil dictator-
ship . . . fortunately that cannot happen in America.”156  This gave 
Gödel the opportunity to interject, “On the contrary, I know how that 
can happen.”157  As one writer put it, “Fortunately for Gödel, Judge 
Forman . . . found Einstein’s presence to be a sufficient reference for 
Gödel, and quickly steered him to other topics.”158
Students of the presidency might well think that Gödel’s concerns 
are worth serious discussion even if one is more complacent than he 
about the potential dangers of the Recess Appointment Clause.  After 
all, enough lawyers, given enough time, are likely to attempt every 
logical argument to its fullest extent on behalf of the interests of their 
clients, including power-seeking presidents of the United States.  If 
there is a plausible way to turn democracy into dictatorship, we should 
have no doubt that at some point in the future some ardent defender 
of presidential prerogatives will stumble across it.  Indeed, some may 
think that this day has already arrived:  to defend several of its policies, 
the Bush administration’s Office of Legal Counsel came up with a 
theory, associated with Vice President Dick Cheney, his close advisor 
John Addington, and Professor John Yoo, which states that when the 
153 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
154 INTEGERS, supra note 151, at 1095. 
155 CASTI & DEPAULI, supra note 150, at 89. 
156 Id. (omission in original). 
157 Id.
158 INTEGERS, supra note 151, at 1095. 
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President acts as Commander-in-Chief, he need not obey statutes 
passed by Congress that would interfere with his powers as the Presi-
dent understands them.159  This Article II theory, taken to its fullest ex-
tent, would also allow presidents to rule by decree if they believed that 
it furthered their activities as Commander-in-Chief.160
Gödel may also have realized that, by the dominant account, Arti-
cle V offers a purely procedural set of requirements for amendments 
to the Constitution.  It imposes no substantive limits on the content of 
amendments other than retaining the slave trade until 1808 and pre-
serving each state’s equal suffrage in the Senate.161  In theory, Article V 
would allow the transformation of the United States Constitution into 
one’s worst nightmare if there were a triumph of sufficient wills to 
meet the supermajority conditions of Article V.162  Ironically, the Nazi-
collaborator Carl Schmitt himself criticized the United States Consti-
tution for being insufficiently committed to the protection of funda-
mental rights.  With further irony, Schmitt at least indirectly influ-
enced the development of the post-war German Constitution, which 
explicitly excludes amendments that affront the constitutionally en-
trenched principles of “human dignity” as well as those that threaten 
the continued existence of German länder.163
159 See, e.g., Yoo, Necessary and Appropriate, supra note 149 (declaring that “[g]eneral 
criminal laws are usually not interpreted to apply to either [the President or the mili-
tary], because otherwise they could interfere with the president’s constitutional re-
sponsibility to manage wartime operations”). 
160 See Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinzation, Reductio ad Dictatorem, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/reductio-ad-dictatorem.html (Apr. 7, 2006) (dis-
cussing the logical consequences of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s theories of 
presidential power). 
161 Akhil Amar has pointed out to us in conversation that the limitation on 
amendments about the Senate is easily avoided.  One could simply abolish the Senate 
through Article V and create a new body with identical powers but a different name 
and a different mode of representation. 
162 For an extended discussion of Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 
(1943), which turns precisely on whether a Communist can in fact be “attached” to the 
“principles” of the Constitution, see LEVINSON, supra note 110, at 135-38, 142-54. The 
Schneiderman majority effectively holds that there are no true substantive principles in-
asmuch as anything is possible through Article V amendment. 
163 See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS 
KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 255 (2004) (critiquing the U.S. Constitu-
tion).  Volker Neumann has written on Schmitt’s influence on the drafting of the 
German Constitution: 
It is an exaggeration to assess the guarantee against changing certain eternal 
constitutional principles in Article 79(3) as an ‘expression in positive law’ of 
Schmitt’s doctrine of the substantive limits of constitutional revision.  This 
provision can plausibly be traced back to Richard Thoma, who participated as 
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As noted above, many constitutional difficulties have never turned 
into constitutional crises precisely because clever lawyering can usually 
transform type one and type two crises into struggles over interpreta-
tion that can be resolved through ordinary forms of politics and judi-
cial decision making.  But before congratulating ourselves on the val-
ues of legal flexibility, we should inject a note of caution.  First, as the 
Gödel story reminds us, creative lawyering cannot only get us out of 
constitutional dead ends, it can also back us into them.  Second, and 
equally important, lawyers taught only the arts of constitutional inter-
pretation, and not the implications of constitutional design, may not 
have much to contribute to either solving or avoiding genuine type 
two crises.  Even if most crises are resolved without bloodshed, the 
Civil War teaches us that the most dangerous crises, and the ones most 
likely to be avoided by careful planning, are of type two, for which 
most lawyers educated in American law schools come completely un-
prepared.  Whether or not this marks a “crisis” in legal education, it is 
certainly a powerful argument for making constitutional design a cen-
tral aspect of any serious course of study in constitutional law. 
an adviser in drawing up the Basic Law and in 1948 proposed such a ‘norm of 
inviolability.’ . . . Thus Schmitt was present in the emergence of Article 79(3) 
at least indirectly. 
Volker Neumann, Introduction, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS, supra note 3, at 
280, 286-87. 
 For a critical analysis of such “eternity provisions,” see generally MELISSA 
SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE (2007). Ackerman defines himself as 
a “democrat” precisely by conceding the possibility of limitless—and constitutionally 
legitimate—change so long as the correct procedures are followed.  See 1 BRUCE AC-
KERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 10-16 (1991).  For a debate about the notion 
of “unconstitutional constitutional amendments,” see Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Mem-
ory:  The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPER-
FECTION 163, 168-90 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); John R. Vile, The Case Against Im-
plicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION,
supra, at 191. 
